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I. INTRODUCTION
Like a widespread epidemic that brings fear and disturbs life on earth,
stringent RoO along with their complexity and worldwide diversity bring fear
to traders, disturb them and hinder international trade.
There are two types of RoO: preferential and non-preferential.
Unfortunately, both types can be used as international trade obstacles.'
Preferential RoO are used to stipulate whether a good is deemed to originate in
a RTA partner country (as in a FTA or a CU) or a preference-granted one (as
in a GSP) and consequently, eligible for preferential treatment.2  Non-
preferential RoO are used for other well-known objectives, including:
gathering trade statistics, government procurement, carrying out origin
marking and labeling requirements and the application of trade policy
instruments as AD duties, CV measures and quantitative restrictions.3 In
general, the establishment of the many preferential contractual4 and/or
autonomous' trade regimes, the intensification in use of using trade policy
instruments, and lowering MFN tariffs are the three main motives that
augment the part of RoO .
About 421 RTAs were reported to the WTO as of December 2008.
As a result of establishing those RTAs, trade barriers have been reduced or
eliminated. Consequently, countries started to use RoO as alternative barriers
to trade by making them too stringent. The level of such stringency could vary
' Joseph A. LaNasa III, An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance ofRules of
Origin and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round's Agreement on Rules of Origin
in Harmonizing and Regulating Them 3 (Harvard L. Sch., The Jean Monnet
Working Papers Series No. 9601, 1996).
2 Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negociations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 397 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/22-roo.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on
Rules of Origin].
Id. at Art I.
4 Contractual preferential trade regimes are also known as bilateral or reciprocal
trade regimes.
5 Autonomous preferential trade regimes are also known as unilateral or non-
reciprocal trade regimes.
6 Edwin Vermulst, Keynote Speech for the ADB Intensive Course on Rules of
Origin, Intensive Course on Rules of Origin 2-4 (Sept. 6, 2004) (transcript is
available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2004/Intensive-Rules-
Origin/text-vermulst.pdf).
7 World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/region-e/region-e.htm (last visited May 17,
2010).
8 Reducing trade barriers does not only happen in that case since it can take place
as well when a country decides to lower its MIFN tariff on a certain good or goods,
regardless of its engagement to any RTA.
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from one RTA to another according to the interest of their constituent parties.
Using RoO as replacement barriers to trade is called as the "Law of Constant
Protection" by Bhagwati.9
In 1995, 138 AD and CV duties were reported to the WTO. In 2000,
the number of AD and CV duties reported to the WTO became 250. In 2003,
the number increased to 220.o In 2008, specifically from the period between
January and June, the number of introduced AD inspections (eighty-five) was
thirty-nine percent higher than that of the parallel period of 2007 (sixty-one). 11
Since such AD duties are imposed against products that originate in a certain
country, the importing country therefore, is obligated to make holdings
concerning the origin of the product. In addition, many circumvention issues
have been solved by using RoO. Thereupon, the part of RoO increased and is
increasing.
"Members shall ensure that . . . rules of origin shall not
themselves create restrictive, distorting, or disruptive effects
on international trade."' 2
Although RoO are playing an increasing role and despite the fact that
they are important for international trade, RoO are considered to be obstacles
to international trade when they are used as protectionist apparatuses and when
their stringency leads to trade diversion. Therefore,, harmonizing and
simplifying non-preferential and preferential RoO to be transparent, unbiased,
predictable and objective 3 is the best solution to overcome the mentioned
problems in order to facilitate international trade and achieve an efficacious
globalization.14
Harmonizing both preferential and non-preferential RoO would cease
all WTO member states from using RoO as concealed commercial policy and
9 Simon P. Anderson & Nicolas Schmitt, Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade
Liberalization 1 (Univ. of Va., Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 340, 2000),
available at
http://www.virginia.edu/economics/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap340.pdf.
1o Vermulst, supra note 6, at 3.
" Press Release, World Trade Organization, WTO Secretariat reports surge in new
anti-dumping investigations (Oct. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres08_e/pr542_e.htm.
12 Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 2, at Art. II.
' Id. at art IX, § 1.
14 Multi-stage production operations are considered to be one of the aspects of
globalization that needs the imposition of flexible RoO worldwide since multi-
national firms usually source inputs by practicing intra-trade between their
branches that are located in more than one country. Usually, trading in computer
parts is an example of the multi-stage production operations. See Kerry A. Chase,
Address on Industry Lobbying and Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements,
International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention 34-35 (Feb. 28-Mar. 3,
2007).
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protectionist tools, would stop them from designing stringent, trade-diverting
RoO, and would eliminate the variation in RoO along with their worldwide
propagation. As a result, exporters and producers would not have to worry
anymore about complying with different RoO imposed by different countries
and RTAs all over the world, and would lead to the abatement of high
administrative costs traders face."
The WTO ARoO strives to harmonize the non-preferential RoO in a
way that prevents such rules from becoming obstacles to trade. Non-
preferential RoO were supposed to be harmonized and added as an annex to
the agreement after three years from the commencement of the HWP.
However, the harmonization process has not been finalized due to the
existence of a number of outstanding issues and the refusal of the concerned
WTO member states to settle these issues and complete the harmonization
process of non-preferential RoO. This proves clearly the will of many WTO
member states to use RoO as tools that protect their own national interests and
susceptible goods.'6
Once cooperation is expanded among the WTO member states to
resolve the outstanding issues, and once the harmonization process is
accomplished by the WTO CRO and TCRO under the under the aegis of the
WCO (was the CCC which was formed in 1952),17 non-preferential RoO will
be harmonized, integrated in the agreement as an annex, and the WTO
member states consequently will have to carry them out from the enforcement
date specified by the ministerial conference."
Having non-preferential RoO harmonized would supply the
harmonization process of preferential RoO, if attempted, with a fine pattern
that the preferential RoO should be based on when harmonized, i.e. to be
based on the same fundamentals of harmonizing non-preferential RoO.19 That
is why harmonizing preferential RoO should be based on the norm that
substantial transformation grants origin if the product is not wholly obtained,
i.e. the application of the CTC method, reinforced, if needed by the VA and/or
the Specific Processing test. 20
1 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, BUSINESS GUIDE TO THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM: PART Two INTERNATIONAL RULES GOVERNING TRADE IN GOODS (GATT
1994 AND ITS ASSOCIATE AGREEMENTS) 159, available at
www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/C12.pdf (last visited May 2, 2009).
16 See MANILA: ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK, OFFICE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC
COOPERATION, How To DESIGN, NEGOTIATE AND IMPLEMENT A FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT IN ASIA 49 (2008).
7 Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 2, art. IV, § 2.
" Id. art. IX, § 4.
19 See the fundamentals of Article IX ARoO. Id.
20 The VA is also known as the "ad valorem."
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It is to be noted, that the harmonization process of both non-
preferential and preferential RoO shall not prejudice the interests of
developing countries and shall not be partial to developed ones. Moreover,
three more steps should be taken when harmonizing preferential RoO. The
first is to apply the denominator and the numerator in accordance with the
standards clarified by the Kyoto Convention when it comes to the application
of the VC requirement. The second is not to permit cumulation rules, which
preserve the origin of the good without being debilitated when it comes to
importing inputs or components from a certain area or country, since they give
rise to trade diversion in intermediate goods. 2' The third step is to get rid of
any PSRoO.
This paper consists of three main parts. The first main part is about
using RoO as a protectionist instrument. The second part considers trade
diversion as an outcome of imposing stringent RoO. The third part is about
harmonizing both non-preferential and preferential RoO. This paper illustrates
how such harmonization could be achieved in order to overcome the problems
facing international trade because of RoO, when such rules act as international
trade obstacles. Furthermore, this paper provides suggested solutions that
would alleviate the negative aspects of RoO and create a system that is
transparent, predictable, and objective. In addition and most importantly, they
would not hinder international trade.
II. RoO AS PROTECTIONIST APPARATUSES:
SPECIAL Focus IN THE TEXTILES AND CLOTHING SECTIONS
". . . Members shall ensure that . . . rules of origin are not
used as instruments to pursue trade objectives directly or
indirectly." 2 2
As a result of establishing various preferential contractual and/or
autonomous trade regimes and lowering MFN tariffs in general, trade barriers
have been reduced or eliminated. Consequently, countries started to use RoO
as alternative barriers to trade in order to protect their own national interests
and susceptible goods.23 Hence, both non-preferential and preferential RoO
21 For further information about cumulation and other forms of RoO, see PAUL
BRENTON, RULES OF ORIGIN IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 2-3 (2003),
http://www.boaoforum.org/06NewDown/5TradeNote%20on%2ORules%20of/20
Origin.pdf.
22 Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 2, Art. 2(b).
23 The term "trade objectives," mentioned in Article 2(b) of the ARoO, refers to the
prohibition of member states to use RoO as a protectionist tool. See Moshe Hirsch,
Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign and Domestic Policies 16 (Paper
submitted to the Conference on "The Politics of International Economic Law: The
Next Four Years," The American Society of International Law: Interest Group on
International Economic Law, 2008).
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can be used as protectionist apparatuses so long as they are not harmonized.
Using non-preferential RoO as a protectionist tool is one of reasons that
motivated the WTO to initiate the HWP; the aim was to establish a joint set of
non-preferential RoO to be applied by all WTO member states worldwide.24
According to the aims of the principles of Article 2 of the WTO
ARoO, the WTO member states are not anticipated to make any alterations to
their RoO as far as the harmonization of non-preferential RoO is
accomplished, because they could use such rules as protectionist instruments.
Unfortunately, breaches to the aims of the WTO ARoO are already taking
place.25 As a result, disputes occurred. One such dispute, concerning the issue
of altering RoO during the transition period, involved the United States and
India.26 The U.S. made some protectionist alterations (they were regarded to
be so) to its apparel and textiles RoO that were enforceable as of the first of
July 1996.27 The EU, China, the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Pakistan were
entitled to act as third parties.28 India introduced the matter to WTO DSB,
which decision was in favor of the U.S. 2 9
Until the harmonization of non-preferential RoO, countries shall
comply with "status quo"3o and shall not make alterations to their RoO that
suit their interests and protect their national susceptible goods. Otherwise,
international trade will witness many disputes like the one previously
mentioned. The harmonization of non-preferential RoO is needed to be
completed soon in order to cease the occurrence of any dispute that could be
aroused during the transition period, like the indicated U.S-India one, as a
result of not complying with status quo.
Imposing stringent RoO in any RTA could lead to excessive
demanding of regional (refers to the regional trade area) finished goods
producers to regional intermediate goods because such demanding makes them
more able to make production operations inside the regional trade area,
comply thus with the RTA imposed stringent RoO, and claim consequently for
the RTA preferences. As a result of the excessive demanding, regional
intermediate goods prices would increase and regional intermediate goods
24K.N. Harilal & P.L. Beena, The WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin: Implications
for South Asia 4 (Centre for Dev. Studies Working Paper No. 353, 2003).
"See id. at 34.
26 Communication from the Permanent Mission of India to the Permanent Mission
of the United States and to the Chairman of the Dispute Settlement Body (Jan. 22,
2002).
27 Harilal & Beena, supra note 24, at 34.
28 World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/casese/ds243_e.htm (last visited
May 17, 2010).
29 See Vermulst, supra note 6, at 10-14.
30 Harilal & Beena, supra note 24, at 34.
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producers would be disguisedly protected.' Moreover, the regional finished
goods producers would be protected because it might be too expensive on
foreign competitors to invest in the regional trade area and simultaneously
source expensive regional inputs to comply with the RTA Stringent RoO,
especially if latter rivals used to import inputs from a more efficient outside
supplierS32 (sources of supply located outside of the regional trade area).
Krueger was right then when she said about FTAs that "a rule of
origin may be a device through which producers of final goods and those of
intermediate goods can be induced to support a FTA."33 However, that is not
always the case because regional finished goods producers might forebear the
preferences, import intermediate goods from outside suppliers by paying the
MFN tariffs, and choose to trade regionally on MFN grounds rather than
complying with the RTA stringent RoO since such rules always require costly
and complex operations to be taken. Accordingly, both rivals (foreign and
regional producers) would prefer to trade on a MFN basis.
As a result, inefficient regional intermediate goods producers would
not find demands from either foreign rivals or regional finished goods
producers to their inputs. Although stringent RoO imposed in a RTA may
prevent foreign emulators from competing with regional producers, in some
other cases, such rules may instead/simultaneously hinder the intra-regional
trade; this would be contrary to the principle of the next mentioned article
since they may not privilege both regional finished goods producerS34 and
regional inefficient intermediate goods ones when the former choose to trade
regionally on a MFN basis and when the latter consequently do not find
demands for their intermediate goods. The low utilization rates of preferences,
illustrated later on in this part, prove that point.
"The contracting parties recognize the desirability of
increasing freedom of trade . . . through voluntary
agreements ... [T]he purpose of a customs union or of a free-
trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent
territories . ...
Pursuant to the fundamentals of the previously mentioned GATT
article, trade facilitation shall arise between the contracting parties to any
RTA. Otherwise, the formation of any regional trade area will be pointless
and useless. Accordingly, if stringent RoO were implemented in a RTA and
31 Since sourcing inputs will be usually from them.
32 Chase, supra note 14, at 18. See also Kerry A. Chase, Protecting Free Trade:
The Political Economy ofRules of Origin, 62 INT'L ORG. 507, 513-14 (2008).
33Anne 0. Krueger, Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of
Origin 21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 4352, 1993).
34 Because of not utilizing the accorded preferences.
3s General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV(4), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt.
5, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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were about to hinder trade between the latter constituent parties, violating the
principles of the stated GATT article XXIV will come to pass.
In preferential trade systems, RoO play a considerable role in avoiding
trade deflection (transshipment of goods). However, too stringent RoO are
applied in many RTAs not to avoid mainly trade deflection, but to protect the
susceptible national products of some of the RTAs constituent parties at which
the level the RoO stringency becomes more than that required to avoid trade
deflection. As a result, complying with the indicated RoO will require costly
and/or complex operations to be taken, and hence, the entry to the markets
protected by the imposition of the RTAs restrictive RoO will be shackled with
respect to the targeted competing products trying to enter them under the
RTAs preferences.36
Although developing countries usually lack the employment of
advanced operations when it comes to producing goods, they are characterized
by inexpensive labor outlays needed during the production processes. That is
why they benefit from the production of apparels since excessive expenditures
and/or advanced operations are unnecessary to set up an enterprise in that
industry.37 This benefit could be nullified when a preference-granting country
attempts to protect its domestic apparels by imposing too stringent RoO on the
competing apparel products of developing countries trying to enter the market
of the former under accorded preferences. Consequently, complying with the
mentioned RoO will require costly and complex operations to be taken by the
developing country which will prevent it from profiting from the accorded
preferences and make it exceedingly difficult for its apparels to compete in the
market of the preference-granting country. Thus, the developing country
might not take advantage of the preferences and instead choose to trade with
the preference-granting country on a MFN basis since this will not charge it
the costly and the complex operations needed to be taken.
The following preferential trade forms clarify how RoO have been
used as protectionist apparatuses.
A. The European Union Generalized System ofPreferences Rules of
Origin
The EU endeavored to harmonize its variegated applicable preferential
RoO. In 1999, the EU tried to achieve this by applying a single set of PSRoO
named "The Single List of PSRoO."3 In July 2000, the EU applied the list in
36 PAUL BRENTON, TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: A WINDOW INTO THE
ISSUES 281-87 (2005).
37 Id. at 283.
38 Commission Regulation 46/1999, Adapting Certain Regulations and Decisions in
the Fields of Free Movement of Goods, 1999 O.J. (LO 10) 1 (amending Regulation
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its GSP regime. Consequently, the single list was applied in the EBA
Agreement as well since the latter is part of the EU GSP regime.40
The EU single list of PSRoO imposed on the clothing products
categorized below chapters sixty-one and sixty-two (clothing products) of the
HS the double transformation41 notion.4 2 According to this notion, yams could
be domestically obtained or imported from anywhere in the world. However,
the yams are required to be woven into fabrics in the preference-given country
at which the fabrics are then to be fabricated into apparels qualified to be
exported to the EU under the preferences given.43 As a result, the imposed
double transformation concept forbade the beneficiary developing countries
from importing fabrics needed for the production of the apparels slated for
export to the EU under the preferences granted. Specifically, the utilization of
only domestic fabrics, EU fabrics (because of the bilateral cumulation done
with the EU) or fabrics imported from the allowed regional cumulation zones
was allowed." However, importing EU fabrics is costly for developing
countries.4 5
Exceptions to the double transformation notion were provided in
chapter sixty-two for some non-crocheted garments, where a less restrictive
2454/93 (EEC), laying down provisions for the implementation of Council
Regulation 2913/92 (EEC), establishing the Community Customs Code.
39 Alberto Portugal-Perez, The Costs ofRules of Origin in Apparel: African
Preferential Exports to the United States and the European Union, in 39 POL'Y
ISSUES IN INT'L TRADE AND COMMODITIES STUDY 4 (2008).
40 The EBA initiative is part of the GSP regime at which the same rules apply to
both of them. The EBA grants the fifty least developed countries special
preferential treatments more than that accorded to the developing countries of the
normal EU GSP regime. See European Trade Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/global/gsp/eba/index en.htm (last visited May 5,
2009); Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/customs/customsduties/rules origin/preferen
tial/article_781 en.htm (last visited May 5, 2009).
41 It is known also by other variety of terms are: two-stage transformation, two-step
conversion, multiple processing, two-stage conversion, fabric forward, or multiple
transformation.
42 See Portugal-Perez, supra note 39, at 4.
43 Id. at 3-4.
"See also Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/customs/customsduties/rules-origin/preferen
tial/article 779_en.htm (last visited May 5, 2009) (Additional information about
various EU cumulation regimes).
45 Janaka Wijayasiri, Utilization of Preferential Trade Arrangements: Sri Lanka's
Experience with the EU and US GSP Scheme 34 (Asia-Pac Research & Training
Network on Trade, Working Paper Series, No. 29, 2007).
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VC rule was permissible to be applied as a substitution to the double
transformation process.4
The EU Double Transformation Process
Yams obtained from anywhere -+* weave them in the beneficiary country
--- fabrics -+ fabricate the fabrics as well in the beneficiary country --.
apparel products qualified to be exported to the EU under preferences.
* Stands for then.
The EU single list of PSRoO was characterized by its complicatedness
at which the CTC method, mostly at the heading level of the HS, mixed with
the VA and specific manufacturing operation approaches was applicable to a
diversity of products.4 7 The intricacy of the EU single list of PSRoO along
with its double transformation notion (stringency) prevented many developing
countries from benefiting from the EU GSP regime since they did not usually
have the appropriate production capacity needed to comply with stringent RoO
and since they rely, in most cases, on the utilization of imported materials
when it comes to production.48
According to Ghoniem, "[o]nly [twenty one percent] of the eligible
imports from GSP beneficiary countries into the EC actually benefited from
GSP tariff preferences up to 19 9 2 .*A9 The situation since the year 2000 could
be expected then what it has been like.
Sri Lanka is one of the developing countries that could not profit much
from the EU GSP regime with regard to its textiles and apparels exportation.
More than that, Sri Lanka's average use of the preferences accorded to it under
the EU GSP regime is poor with respect to "foodstuffs, beverages, and
machinery & electrical equipment" because of its incapability to comply with
the imposed EU GSP RoO.so
In response to the Tsunami crisis, the EU in 2005, granted Sri Lanka
benefits, under the GSP+ system, more than those given through the ordinary
EU GSP regime at which duty-free access to the EU were guaranteed for 7,200
46 Further information about the single list of PSRoO is available at EC GSP
Scheme, UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poitcdtsbm25r1.en.pdf (last
visited Apr. 3, 2009).
47 Antoni Estevadeordal, Jeremy Harris & Kati Suominen, Multilateralising
Preferential Rules of Origin around the World 9 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working
Paper Series No. #IDB-WP-137, 2009).
48 IUNIR AHMAD, IMPACT OF ORIGIN RULES FOR TEXTILES AND CLOTHING ON
DEVELOPING COuNTRIES 32 (2007).
49 Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim, Rules of Origin and Trade Diversion: The Case of the
Egyptian-European Partnership Agreement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 597,607-08
(2003) (first presented at the annual conference of Economic Research Forum in
January 2002).
so Wijayasiri, supra note 45, at 35.
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Sri Lankan products.5 ' Unfortunately, Sri Lanka could not benefit from the
GSP+ regime concerning its textiles and apparels exportation due to the
stringency of the EU imposed double transformation rule of origin, taking into
consideration that Sri Lanka relies mainly on imported yarns and fabrics when
it comes to producing apparels. 52 To determine the extent of such reliance, it
is worth mentioning that in Sri Lanka, the EU fabrics constitute eleven percent
of the total fabric imports, the SAARC fabrics constitute twelve percent, the
ASEAN fabrics constitute six percent and the fabrics imported from further
zones constitute seventy one percent.53
China in fact is considered to be one of reasons that made the EU
imposed stringent RoO in its GSP regime. It is regarded as a rival apparel
provider. Many developing countries enrolled in the EU GSP regime source
fabrics from China. For instance, in 2001, sixty-five percent of Bangladesh's
total imported fabrics were from China5 4 and forty-nine percent of Cambodia's
total imported fabrics were from China as well."
Because of the geographical location of many developing Asian
countries near China, these developing countries could easily source low-
priced and fine fabrics from China and use them in producing apparels.
However, for the sake of staying away from such Chinese threat, the EU
imposed the stringent double transformation rule of origin in its GSP regime to
prevent the Chinese fabrics from entering its markets under preferences with
the produced apparels of the beneficiary Asian developing countries and to
induce the apparel producers of the latter to source materials from it rather
than from more efficient Chinese sources of supply.56 The incapability of
many developing countries to comply with the imposed EU GSP RoO is
manifested in the utilization proportions of their preferences under the EU
GSP regime. Many developing Asian countries such as Laos, Bangladesh,
Nepal, Cambodia, India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and the Philippines could not
51 Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006, ROUTES FOR
AsiA's TRADE, Dec. 2006, at 18,
http://www.itcb.org/Documents/Impact%200rigin%2ORules.pdf.
Id.; see also Ratnakar Adhikari & Chatrini Weeratunge, Textiles & Clothing
Sector in South Asia: Coping with Post-quota Challenges, in MULTILATERALISM
AT CROSS-ROADS: REAFFIRMING DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES 109 (2006).
5 Wijayasiri, supra note 45, at 34-35.
5 South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment, Salvaging the Doha
Round, 3 TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 9, (2004), available at
http://www.sawtee.org/pdf/publication/tdm8.pdf.
5 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Trade
Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment of Benefits and Possible
Improvements, at 67, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8 (2003).
See Paul Brenton & Miriam Manchin, Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The
Role ofRules ofOrigin 13 (Centre for Eur. Pol'y Stud,. Working Paper No. 183,
2002).
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take advantage of the EU GSP system. The mean rate of utilizing the
preferences of the mentioned countries under EU GSP regime for chapters 61
and 62 is considered to be low. From 1996 to 2000, the rate of Bangladesh,
Nepal, Cambodia, and Laos was lower than fifty percent for chapters 61 and
62, while the rate of India, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Philippine for the same
chapters was lower than forty percent.
Mahbubur Rahman, the president of the International Chamber of
Commerce-Bangladesh, clarified that the imposed stringent RoO in the EU
GSP regime did not help the LDCs to quite take advantage of the preferences
accorded to them under the latter regime. He illustrated further that
substituting the EU stringent RoO with appeased ones would "open an
important window of opportunities for LDCs like Bangladesh"58
"The end justifies the means" 5.. . It is well known, that developing
countries need the preferences accorded to them by any preference-granting
country. This need leads to the fact that sometimes a beneficiary country does
not comply with an imposed stringent RoO of a unilateral trade regime, and
illegally benefits through the preferences given to it under the regime.
Benefiting illegally through the preferences happens when an origin certificate
comes out unfairly or incorrectly, although compliance with the imposed
stringent rule of origin has not taken place, i.e. when fraud takes place.
The Bangladesh T-shirts case is a realistic example for this.60 From
1997 to 1998, Bangladesh's mean "utilization" proportion of preferences under
the EU GSP regime was lower than thirty percent. The main reasons behind
this are the consequences of the Bangladesh T-shirts case. In March 1995,
some EU customs authorities noticed a flow of imported T-shirts from
Bangladesh. They decided to request the Department of Trade and Industry to
check the validity of the T-shirts' origin certificates. The EU member states,
the EU commission, and EU customs authorities conducted an inspection
concerning the issue. According to the results, ten thousand origin certificates
did not come out correctly. Consequently, a fine and customs duties on all T-
shirts that were exported to the EU "covered" by incorrect origin certificates
were paid to the EU. In 1997, the total compliance with the imposed EU RoO
became a condition to bring out origin certificates (form A) 6 1 for textiles and
5 UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 55-58.
58Product Diversification Key to Utilizing EU Market Access Facility, DAILY STAR,
Feb. 26, 2006, available at
http://www.thedailystar.net/2006/02/24/d60224050145.htm.
5 This attributed quote belongs to Niccold di Bernardo dei Machiavelli. The
History Guide, http://www.historyguide.org/earlymod/machiavelli.html (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).
60 UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 62.
61 Form A is a GSP origin certificate. Form A certificates are brought out for only
commodities that are produced in accordance with the imposed RoO. Moreover,
such commodities shall be produced by plants registered in the Department of
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apparel products exported from Bangladesh to the EU. This total compliance
was the raison d'itre of the mentioned drop in Bangladesh's utilization
proportion of preferences under the EU GSP scheme from 1997 to 1998.62
What could be learned from the Bangladesh T-shirts case is that
developing countries are in need of any preference accorded to them. If
stringent RoO are going to be imposed to prevent them as much as possible
from competing, improving, and thus utilizing the preferences, circumventing
these rules, dealing with them as if they do not exist, and profiting at any cost
could take place. As a result, cases and disputes would infiltrate international
trade. Some would win those cases and others would lose. Some would win
today and others would lose tomorrow, so why bother in the first place with
imposing stringent RoO? Is it because of being afraid of competition? Being
afraid of improvement? Being afraid of giving consumers choices? Imposing
stringent RoO in a GSP regime could undermine the will of the beneficiary
developing countries to take advantage of, or utilize, the accorded preferences.
Alternatively, the beneficiaries might choose as a loophole to forebear the
granted preference and trade with the preference-granting country on a IFN
grounds rather than complying with the RoO.' Therefore, before imposing
any GSP RoO in unilateral trade regimes, the preference-granting country
should first gather statistics and information related to the production
capability of the preference-given country, i.e., the amount of imported inputs
needed for production, local resources and production firms. Pursuant to such
gathered statistics, the RoO should be appropriately imposed. Otherwise,
complying with the latter would be difficult and would need production
operations that could not be taken easily by the beneficiary country since the
latter would not have the sufficient supplies needed for production in
accordance with the imposed RoO, leading to its inability to benefit
from/utilize the preferences accorded to it under the unilateral regime. The
only explanation that clarifies why a preference-granting country would not
want to gather the mentioned statistics and accordingly apply appropriate RoO
on a beneficiary country is to use RoO as protectionist apparatuses, i.e., to
protect its susceptible products and national interests.
The EU commission brought out a green paper that evaluates the
application of its RoO in preferential agreements, especially those done with
Trade and Industry. More information about the Form A origin certificate and a
sample is available at Trade and Industry Department of the Government of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Trade and Industry Department, the
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/publications/registcert/files/forma.pdf; see
HONG KONG TRADE AND INDUSTRY DEPARTMENT, How TO APPLY FOR A
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN FORM A (2005),
http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/publications/registcert/files/forma.pdf.
62For more details about the case, see UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 62.
63 Wijayasiri, supra note 45, at 5.
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developing countries." The paper illustrates that the insufficiency of
manufacturing firms, investment chances or managerial systems in the
beneficiary developing countries, along with the inefficiency oftraders there to
comprehend the complex imposed EU RoO, made it arduous for the
beneficiary developing countries to comply with EU RoO and, consequently,
benefit much from the preferences accorded to them by the EU. Furthermore,
the green paper made clear that the main part of the EU preferential RoO was
to protect the interests of the EU when they are applied to its imports.
B. The South African Development Community
The SADC member states urged the application of stringent RoO. As
a result, crucial modifications were made to their protocol. Stringent PSRoO
were implemented which substituted the double transformation test for the
CTC method. Furthermore, such test was applicable, along with the specific
manufacturing operation requirement, to a variety of products. In addition, the
minimum value of imported materials allowed to be used in producing
products was decreased, while the required VA of local inputs was increased.
It is indeed noticeable that the SADC RoO became, after the mentioned
modifications, as alike as the EU specified RoO. More importantly, they were
used as well for protectionist purposes (which will be illustrated next).
Because of the excessive existing pauperism in the four SADC
member states of Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia (MMTZ), these
countries were the only ones to be exempted from the application ofthe double
transformation test6 when exporting to the SACU 8 and subjected to limited
quotas6 up to 2005.70
6 See European Commission Green Paper on the Rule of Origin in Preferential
Trade Arrangements, COM (2003) 787 final (Dec. 18, 2003).6 1 Id. at 7.66p. Brenton, F. Flatters & P. Kalenga, Rules of Origin and SADC: The Case for
Change in the Mid-Term Review of the Trade Protocol 16-17 (World Bank, Afr.
Region Working Paper, Series No. 83, 2005).
67 They instead have to comply with the single transformation rule.
68 The SACU consists of only five members so far, which are: Botswana, South
Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho.
69 The MMTZ were subjected to limited quotas only on sugar, textiles and apparels.
This actually indicates their sensitive nature.70 FRANK FLATTERS & ROBERT KIRK, RULES OF ORIGIN AS TOOLS OF
DEVELOPMENT? SOME LESSONS FROM SADC 18, available at
http://www.unige.ch/ses/ecopo/demelo/Cdrom/RLA/Readings/FlattersKirk3.pdf.
See also SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC), PROCEDURES
MANUAL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES OF ORIGIN APPENDIX I OF
ANNEX I OF THE SADC PROTOCOL ON TRADE 7 (2004),
http://www.sadc.int/attachment/download/file/7.
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Regarding the textile and apparel production, the SADC focused
mostly on its inter-regional trade and on the utilization and of its regional
materials. More often than not, it favored selling its apparel products
regionally and preferred turning away from competing internationally.
Accordingly, the SADC implemented the stringent RoO and the double
transformation norm: to force the regional producers who seek the preferences
to use local and regional components when producing apparels and to assure
consequently the inability of producers using imported materials to enjoy the
preferences and compete regionally with the former producers. Unfortunately,
apparel producers of the SADC member states do not have the capability to
produce the materials needed for producing apparels.7 1
As long as most apparel producers in the SADC need imported
materials when producing apparels72 and as long as sourcing such materials
from outside of the region needs the facilitation of their importation by the
application of appropriate RoO, which is not the case in the SADC, the SADC
would not therefore improve in its textiles and apparels production. As a
result, the SADC apparel products would not be able to internationally
compete with foreign apparel ones,, unless appropriate pliancy and
facilitations13 concerning production are to be offered for the SADC producers
since facilitating trade has been proven to be the most efficient way that
improves production and encourages hence international competition.74 For
instance, South Africa has one of the world's best kettle outlets. It "accounts
for about 4 percent of the entire global market for electric kettles." 5 Although
local producers in South Africa favor using local inputs when it comes to
production, importing cord sets from China from time to time takes place in
order to use them as inputs in producing kettles. In many other cases, South
Africa imports inputs from other foreign markets. For example, electronic
motors from Italy were used to produce electronic sweepers that were exported
to the Middle East. Facilitating trade and the ability to source inputs from
efficient sources of supply are the main causes of improvement and were the
71 REG'L AGRIC. TRADE EXPANSION SUPPORT PROGRAM (RATES), COTTON AND
TEXTILE REGIONAL TRADE POLICY PAPER: IN SEARCH OF REGIONAL STRATEGIES
FOR EXPANDING INTRA AND EXTRA REGIONAL TRADE IN COTTON AND TEXTILE
PRODUCTS, A FINAL REPORT 19 (2005), available at
http://dec.usaid.gov/index.cfn?p=search.getCitation&CFID=7775&CFTOKEN=99
688013&rec no=153040.
72 For example, South Africa depends on the importation of materials when
producing apparels and would never be able to compete globally, if sourcing
materials from outside the region is not allowed.
73 Pliancy and facilitations can take place by not imposing stringent RoO, as a
tolerant VC requirement (which will help in importing inputs from efficient
producers), and by reducing the MFN tariffs on the imported inputs wanted to be
used in production.
74 Brenton, supra note 66, at 27, 30-31.
7s FLATTERS & KIRK, supra note 70, at 13.
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main reasons that made the South African kettle industry improve and compete
globally.76
C. The African Growth Opportunity Act
The U.S. under the AGOA77 applied to the imported non-apparel
products of the beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries a flexible rule of
origin that is a thirty-five percent across-the-board VC requirement.
However, the U.S. applied the stringent triple transformation rule79 to imported
apparel products of the beneficiaries, taking into consideration that apparels
are deemed to be sensitive products for the U.S.80
An exception to the application of the triple transformation rule was
accorded to LDBCs until September 30, 2007, which allowed them to use
fabrics sourced from a third country when producing apparels.8 , All of the
AGOA beneficiaries are categorized as LDBCs, with an exception to only four
of them: Gabon, South Africa, Seychelles, and Mauritius.82
The U.S. has been applying a special rule to LDBCs that will expire
by September 30, 2012. The rule grants the apparel exports of the latter to the
" Id. at 16.
n The AGOA is a legislation that was signed by the former U.S. President Bill
Clinton and ratified by Congress accepted by the congress in May, 2000. The act
was supposed to expire in 2008, but then the former U.S. President Bush came and
extended its duration until September 30, 2015, by the AGOA Acceleration Act of
2004 (AGOA III). See Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200,
114 Stat. 251 (2000); AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-274, 118
Stat. 820 (2004); African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
200, 114 Stat. 252 (2000).
78 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, AFRICAN GROWTH AND
OPPORTUNITY ACT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE 6 (2000). See also AGOA.info,
http://www.agoa.info/index.php?view-about&story=rulesof origin (last visited
Feb. 10, 2010).
7 The triple transformation rule is also known as the three-stage conversion, the
yam forward rule, or the triple-stage transformation.
80 Most of the exports from the AGOA countries, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Jordan,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti and Mexico to the
U.S. are apparels, which clarifies the sensitivity of apparel products worldwide and
in the U.S. when it comes to international trade. See AHMAD, supra note 48, at 20.
81 AGOAinfo, http://www.agoa.info/index.php?view-about&story=apparel_rules
(last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
82 It is to be noted that the AGOA Acceleration Act applied the Exception to
Mauritius (accorded it "LDBCs status") for only one year, until September 30,
2005. See Commercial Availability of Fabric and Yarns in AGOA Countries:
Certain Denim, Investigation No. AGOA--07---001, at C04 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n (USITC), Publication 3950 (Sept. 30, 2007). See also AGOAinfo,
http://www.agoa.info/index.php?view-download&story-maps (last visited Feb. 10,
2010) (for information about the LDBCs status).
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U.S. "duty- and quota-free treatment" and allows them further to employ
fabrics and yams imported from anywhere in the world when producing
apparels. However, in order to benefit from the special rule, the assembly must
be done in one or more of the LDBCs. In addition, the apparel products
exported to the U.S. under the special rule are submitted to a cap (quantitative
limitation).8 3 Pursuant to the AGOA triple transformation rule, yams are to be
sourced from the U.S. or a beneficiary country.84 Afterwards, the yams are
woven into fabrics in the preference-given countries or the U.S. at which the
fabrics thereupon should be fabricated into apparels qualified consequently to
be exported to the U.S. under the accorded preferences.
The AGOA Triple Transformation Process
Yams sourced from the preference-given countries or the U.S --+ weave
them in the U.S or a beneficiary country - fabrics --+ fabricate the fabrics
apparel products qualified to be exported to the U.S under preferences.
In point of fact, both of the triple and double transformation rules are
used as protectionist instruments. Although both of them are used for such
same purpose by the U.S. and the EU, it is unambiguous to realize that the
stages of protection targeted by each one of them are different.
Since the AGOA triple transformation process does not allow sourcing
yams and fabrics from anywhere other than the U.S. or the beneficiary
countries, it is therefore, more restrictive than the double transformation
process. The difference between the levels of their stringency is obviously
reflected in their names: triple and double.
Although the stringency of the triple transformation rule could help in
deterring trade deflection from happening, its level is quite more than that
needed to avoid the deflection.
Actually, there are other appropriate alternatives that can be used to
fulfill the same aim.
83 See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2007 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT
ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT 16 (2007),
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/assetupload-file762_11294pdf 11294.pdf.
8 In fact, this is diagonal cumulation.
85 THE SERVICES GROUP, INC., SOUTHERN AFRICA GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS HUB:
RULES OF ORIGIN, "COMMERCIAL AVAILABILITY" AND TRADE PREFERENCES:
DENIM AND AGOA (2007), available at
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/flatters/writings/ff denim agoa.pdf.
86Aaditya Mattoo, Devesh Roy & Arvind Subramaniand, The Africa Growth and
Opportunity Act and its Rules of Origin: Generosity Undermined? 18 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2908, 2002).
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Teasing the cotton, spinning it, weaving the yams, fabricating the
fabrics, adorning the apparels and all clothing production processes can be
simply checked up by officially surveying the apparel production firms and
scrutinizing their stocktaking books, package deals and demands. Thus, using
the triple transformation rule as a disguised protectionist device is the only
reason that explains why the U.S. prefers applying it, although the existence of
the other suitable options that could be used to avoid the trade deflection.
In truth, the beneficiary sub-Saharan African developing countries
could have taken advantage of the AGOA five times more, if RoOs were not
imposed on them.88
Primarily, in AGOA, a plain single transformation rule89 was going to
be the applicable one to the apparel products imported to the U.S. by the
preference-given countries. However, the U.S. clothing "industry" turned it
down and was the one that had a great impact on applying instead the triple
transformation rule, which obstructed the aim of providing employment
opportunities in the region.90 As a matter of fact, this came to pass because the
U.S. materials are, indeed, not as catchy and emulative as the Asian ones.9'
What happened in 2003 and 2004 illustrates this point. In 2003, only nineteen
percent of the beneficiaries' apparel exports to the U.S. under AGOA were
produced by the usage of regional- or domestic-sourced materials.92 In 2004,
just 2.2% of the U.S market was held by the preference-given countries, taking
7 Id. at 7.
88 Fabien Candau & Jean Sdbastien, What are European Union Trade Preferences
Worth for Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Countries, in TRADE
PREFERENCE EROSION MEASUREMENT AND POLICY RESPONSE 65-102 (2009).
89 The single transformation rule is also known as the single-stage conversion rule.
It is when the yarns and fabrics used in producing the apparels are permitted to be
sourced from a third country.
90 NTL TRADE CENTRE, FOSTERING TRADE THROUGH PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIALOGUE:
BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS OF EPA NEGOTIATIONS FOR SADC 12 (2007). This report
was prepared for a Regional Experts Meeting for South African Development
Community at Stellenbosch, South Africa, June 11-12, 2007. An example of the
employment opportunities that were obstructed is what happened in South Africa
from 2002 until 2005, when 37,723 positions were lost. INST. FOR GLOBAL
DIALOGUE, CASE STUDY: THE CLOTHING INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA 3 (2005),
available at http://www.cuts-citee.org/documents/CASE STUDY-SA.doc.
91 They are not as the Asian ones because of the high quality and low price of the
Asian materials, mainly china as mentioned before. Besides, the transportation
costs from China are cheaper than from the U.S. See Mattoo, supra note 86, at 13.
See also MATTHIAS KNAPPE, REPORT AT UNCTAD INTERGOVERNMENTAL EXPERT
MEETING ON DYNAMIC AND NEW SECTORS OF WORLD TRADE TEXTILES AND
CLOTHING 8 (2005).
92 Leanne R. Sedowski, Hanging by a Thread?: The Post-MFA Competitive
Dynamics of the Clothing Industry in Madagascar 29 (Research Report No. 78,
2008).
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into account that the apparel products constituted ninety six percent of their
exports to the U.S. More importantly, eighty six percent of beneficiaries
exported apparel products were produced from Asian fabrics, while a fourteen
percent of them were produced from African fabrics.93 That is why the triple
transformation rule was imposed by the U.S.: to induce the AGOA
beneficiaries 94 to use only U.S. or regional materials when producing
apparels,95 to help hence the U.S. clothing industry in supplying its undesired
materials to the beneficiaries 96 and to guarantee therefore the inability of the
Asian competitive materials to enter the U.S. markets under preferences with
the imported apparel products of the beneficiary countries.. This then proves
that both the triple and double transformation processes were used for the
same aim, i.e. as protectionist apparatuses.
Using RoO as protectionist instruments, shackling the importation of
materials on specific countries, making the latter bound to source costly
components and coercing them to undertake high technological production
processes are all reasons that could weaken the utilization of the preferences
provided under any RTA. It is worth mentioning then that the consequences of
applying the triple transformation rule in AGOA were brought to light in 2002.
In that year, the Mauritian and South African apparel exports to the U.S.
constituted ninety percent and four percent of their total exports there.
Unfortunately, only forty one percent and forty seven percent of them took
advantages of the given preferences.
1. The Flexibility of RoO Facilitates Trade and Spreads
Welfare in Preferential Trade Regimes: the Experience of
Lesotho
"No other sector currently offers the same opportunities for
stimulating growth, increasing employment and promoting
technological transfers."98
That was the impact of the apparel industry in Lesotho when its
apparel exportation was facilitated because of exempting it from complying
93 See Knappe, supra note 91, at 3.
94 The author here refers to the four non-LDBCs.
95 Only in case such apparels are needed to be exported to the U.S. under the
preferences accorded, because if they are not, the beneficiaries therefore can import
materials from anywhere in the world and choose instead paying rather the MFN
tariffs.
9 Because the producers who want to claim for the granted preferences have to
demand materials from the U.S. in order for them to comply with the triple
transformation rule.
97 Brenton, supra note 66, at 6.
9 8 ANDREw SALM ET AL., DEP'T FOR INT'L DEV., LEsoTHo GARMENT INDUSTRY
SUBSECTOR STUDY FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LEsoTHo 52 (2002).
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with the AGOA triple transformation rule.99 In addition, Lesotho witnessed
more than a fifty percent increase in their job opportunities in the apparel
section between 200000 and 2004.101
The United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick once said, "I
visited sub-Saharan Africa . . . and I stopped in Lesotho -- the first U.S.
Cabinet official ever to be in Lesotho -- which sends some $350-$400 million
of textile exports [to the United States] under AGOA."l 02
In 2004, the apparel exports of Lesotho to the U.S. constituted $455.9
million. This caused Lesotho to be the biggest apparel exporter to the U.S. that
year. 103
What happened in Lesotho proves that the imposition of tolerant RoO
on developing countries facilitates their trade,'" leads thus to their prosperity
and helps them in the process of their development.
2. The Double-edged Sword Rule, Pessimistic Expectations
for A GOA and How to Overcome the Foreseen Odds:
The AGOA triple transformation rule is "a double-edged sword." On
the one hand, complying with it could induce the beneficiaries to augment and
ameliorate their "capacities" in apparel production. On the other hand, it could
obstruct the preference-given countries from utilizing the accorded
preferences, if they do not have the mentioned capacities needed to produce
99 BERNARD HOEKMAN, WORLD BANK, OPERATIONALIZING THE CONCEPT OF
POLICY SPACE IN THE WTO: BEYOND SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 3
(2004). See also BERNARD HOEKMAN, WORLD BANK, DEVELOPMENT AND THE
GLOBAL TRADE ARCHITECTURE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE GLOBAL TRADE AND
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE PROJECT 15 (2005).
100 This is the year when the AGOA got accepted by the congress.
101 Commission Staff Working Document on Communication on the Rules of Origin
in Economic Partnership Agreement Regional Negotiations: Impact Assessment of
Rules of Origin for Textiles and Clothing, at 20, SEC (2007) 1168 (Sept. 11, 2007)
(paper accompanied the communication from Mr. Kovacs and Mr. Mandelson to
the Commission in Agreement with Mr. Michel, Brussels).
102 Charles W. Corey, Zoellick Says, New Mood, Will in Africa to Create
Opportunity, WASH. FILE, Feb. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.allamericanpatriots.com/2006268.zoellick-saysnew-moodwillafri
cacreateopportunity.
103 MIKE MORRIS & LEANNE SEDOWSKI, TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY
SECRETARIAT, GLOBALIZATION AND THE POST MFA ENVIRONMENT: THE
COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS AND POLICY RESPONSIVENESS OF THECLOTHING
INDUSTRY IN MADAGASCAR 7 (2005).
1" Trade in mainly apparel products since developing countries are characterized
by their inexpensive labor outlays needed during the apparel production processes.
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apparels pursuant to the rule.os Therefore, RoO imposed in any autonomous
trade regime should be proportionate with the production capacities of the
beneficiaries.
The production capacity can be calculated by gathering statistics and
information about the established capacity of the preference-given country and
by knowing to what range such country uses its established capacity.106
The best level of production capacity occurs when a kind of
equilibrium between the established capacity and capacity utilization takes
place. For instance, in 2003, the spinning capacity (established capacity) of
South Africa was 638,000 spindles and its utilization to the capacity
(production) was seventy eight percent - eighty four percent.'07 The capacity
utilization of Mauritius the same year was high as well (seventy five percent to
eighty percent). 08 This, in fact, proves why the U.S. did not apply the special
rule to South Africa and Mauritius. There is another example that indicates
the contrary and happened also in 2003. In that year, the spinning and
weaving capacities of Malawi were 70,000,000 and 60,000,000 square meters.
However, the utilization of its capacities was 4.3% and zero percent.109 Since
the utilization of Malawi to its capacity was that much low, it would not have
been able to produce apparels pursuant to the triple transformation rule, if the
exception and special rule were not applied to it. Thus, after September 30,
2012 (the deadline of the application of the special rule), no positive effects
could be expected to take place in sub-Saharan Africa because of the AGOA.
LDBCs that have the same problem as Malawi" 0 would not be able to
benefit from the AGOA preferences in the apparels sector since they rely
mainly on the importation of materials rather than producing them" and since
they will not be able as a result to comply with the triple transformation rule,
unless an extension to the duration of applying the special rule to them is to
happen.
05Frank Flatters, Rules of Origin and AGOA: Hard Choices for Textiles and
Clothing, in SADC 3 (June 30, 2002), available at
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/faculty/flatters/writings/ff hard choices.pdf.
106 The idea illustrates the importance of gathering information about the "installed
capacity" and "capacity utilization" of any beneficiary. See also COMESA,
COTTON AND TEXTILE REGIONAL TRADE POLICY PAPER: PROPOSALS FOR A
REGIONAL POLICY PLATFORM IN SUPPORT OF REGIONAL VALUE CHAIN (2005),
available at http://www.actifafrica.com (for information about the LDBCs status).
107 Id. at 9.
1os Id. at 10.
109 Id.
no See id. For example, while the spinning capacity of Tanzania in 2003 was
64,355 MT, its utilization to the capacity was only 41.7%.
111 They barely have the ability in that case to produce apparel because their
installed capacity might be insufficient to be highly utilized, because their
utilization to their capacity is low or both.
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As for non-LDBCs, the continuance of applying the triple
transformation rule along with its "capital-intensive nature" to them could tire
out their production capacity, even if it was deemed to be high before, leading
potentially to their inability to comply with the triple transformation rule in the
future and benefit consequently from the AGOA preferences."12
According to the current available information, the previous mentioned
expectations would happen to South Africa, even though its capacity
utilization was deemed to be high in 2003.
Since 2005, the amount of South Africa's apparel exports to the U.S.
has been declining."3 In 2007, a South African apparel company's managing
director said, "The local textile industry can't give us what we need in terms of
quality, delivery and service."ll 4 That is why South Africa, to a considerable
112 Because of the imposed double transformation rule in the EU GSP regime "most
least-developed countries are unable to take full advantage of the facility, lacking
as they are in textile manufacturing capacity due to the highly capital-intensive
nature of this segment of textile and clothing production". Ahmad, supra note 48,
at 10. Moreover, a significant portion of clothing is made with fabrics of new
fibres with technologies patented in the developed world." Id Since the double
transformation needs that kind of capital and technological operations, the triple
transformation rule is considered to be then a bigger problem for the beneficiaries
of the AGOA and all other regimes using the same rule, as the U.S.-Singapore
FTA (USSFTA). United States -Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing.,
May 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 948 (2003), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/safta/index.html.
"
3 MIKE MORRIS & LEANNE SEDOwSKI, GLOBALIZATION AND THE POST MFA
ENVIRONMENT, TIPS/DPRU FORuM 2005: TRADE AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 7 (2005), available at
http://www.tips.org.za/files/779.pdf. In this reference and at that page, it is stated
that the exports of South Africa "now trails substantially behind." The word "now"
pursuant to the year of publishing the reference stands for the year 2006.
114 When South Africa tried to encourage the sourcing of its domestic materials by
imposing quotas on the Chinese fabrics, many South African apparel producers
became discomfited. One of them said "three production lines are standing empty
because orders have dried up due to the unavailability of certain quota-affected
fabric; and ... [our] intimate wear factory has shrunk to half its size." See THE
SERVICES GROUP, SOUTHERN AFRICA GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS HUB, RULES OF
ORIGIN, "COMMERCIAL AVAILABILITY" AND TRADE PREFERENCES: DENIM AND
AGOA 10 (2007), available at
http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/faculty/flatters/writings/ff denim agoa.pdf. Another
one said "we're battling to get fabric and our CMT suppliers suffer because we
can't give them the work flow. They're sitting without work so their efficiency goes
out of the window." Id. This really indicates that, if the AGOA triple
transformation rule is going to be continuously imposed on all of the South African
apparels along with all other non-LDBCs, all of the latter would not have the
ability to comply anymore with it because of the declination that is happening to
the level of their capacity.
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extent, does not have anymore the capacity needed to produce apparels using
domestic materials, although its apparel producers have the desire to do so. 5
If South Africa is facing the specified circumstances, although its capacity
utilization was high in 2003 and although it was one of the biggest apparel
exporters to the U.S. under AGOA in 2004,' 16 what have happened to the rest
of the non-LDBCs could be imagined. That is why, South Africa, along with
all other non-LDBCs, is not expected to benefit much from the AGOA in the
near future as long as the triple transformation rule is exhausting all of the their
production capacity and as long as they are not allowed to use materials
sourced from a third country when producing apparels needed to be exported
to the U.S. under the AGOA preferences.
Another incident that should be taken into consideration before it is
too late for the beneficiaries to benefit from the AGOA is the expiration of the
ATCl 7 in 2005 since it has resulted in shutting down firms and since it has
caused a loss to many positions in both Lesotho and Swaziland." 8
The fact that the non-LDBCs are running out of capacity and the fact
that the LDBCs are running out of time to comply with the special rule implies
that all of them do not deserve to face more obstacles in the future when
claiming for the AGOA preferences.
Since the reported aim of the AGOA is to ameliorate the economy of
beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries'19 and since the provided
preferences in any RTA aims at improving the industries of the contracting
parties, the application of appropriate AGOA RoO suiting the production
capability of the beneficiaries, also taking into consideration any visible future
expectations concerning their capacity, is hence necessary for the achievement
of the mentioned amelioration and improvement.12 0 Otherwise, the imposition
of the AGOA triple transformation rule on the beneficiaries in 2012, or any too
stringent rule of origin, would not help in the improvement of their apparel
production, 121 would hinder their intra-regional trade, would not ameliorate
thus their economy, and would not encourage them as a result to claim for the
AGOA preferences. Consequently, the preference-given countries would not
have the ability to globally compete.
115 d
"
6See MORRIS & SEDOWSKI, supra note 113, at 7.
" The ATC is also known as the Multi Fibre Arrangement.
118 Morris & Sedowski, supra note 113, at 35.
"
9 See 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000).
120 See STEFANO INAMA, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR LDCs: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT
OF BENEFrrS AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS at xii (2003).
121Id. at 82.
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D. The NAFTA
"Free trade is not based on utility but on justice."l 2 2 Many believe that
the NAFTA RoO is one of the most complex RoO applied in preferential trade
regimes.
According to Estevadeordal, the NAFTA and the EU RoO systems are
"both among the most complex regimes in the world." 23
By using the three means of determining origin (the CTC, the RVC
requirement and the specific manufacturing operation), the NAFTA RoOl 2 4 are
imposed on products classified "mostly at the 6-Digit tariff line level" of the
HS. 125
The stringency of the NAFTA RoO mainly takes place when the
combination of more than one means of determining the origin becomes a
single rule that is requisite for a product to comply with, for instance, the rule
that requires the product to comply with a CTC test along with a VC
requirement is more restrictive than the one requiring solely the CTC test.
Furthermore, the restrictiveness of the CTC test varies according to the level at
which the required change should be done (i.e. the CTCh requirement is more
restrictive than the CTH one; which is more restrictive than the CTSH; which
is more restrictive than the CTI).12 6 Moreover, the value ofthe non-originating
inputs permitted to be utilized under the tolerance rule (or de minimis), which
treats a fixed magnitude of non-originating components used in producing a
final product as if they are originating, 127 is set at only 7%. 128 More than that,
the tolerance rule is implemented on the grounds of weight for apparel
122 The attributed quote belongs to Edmund Burke. Thinkexist.com,
http://thinkexist.com/quotes/edmundburke/4.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010).
123 Estevadeordal., supra note 47, at 28.
124 Full details about such Rules could be seen in Annex 401 of the NAFTA. North
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, Annex 401,
available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/ann-401-03.aspx?lang=eng (containing full
details about such Rules).
125 Antoni Estevedeordal, Negotiating Preferential Market Access: The Case of
NAFTA, 34 J. OF WORLD TRADE 12 (2000).
126 id
127Miriam Manchin & Annette 0. Pelkmans-Balaoing, Rules of Origin and the Wed
ofEast Asian Free Trade Agreements 6 (World Bank Pol'y Research, Working
Paper No. 4273, 2007).
128 This value is considered to be low, especially if compared with other tolerance
rules of other preferential regimes. For example, under the EU GSP regime and the
Cotonou agreement the de minimis is set at ten percent and fifteen percent. See Paul
Brenton, Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications for Regional Integration on
Southeast Asia, Presented at Pacific Econ. Cooperation Council Trade Forum 28
(2003).
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products instead of value of non-originating inputs.12 9 Besides, it "does not
extend to the production of dairy produce, edible products of animal origin,
citrus fruit and juice, instant coffee, cocoa products, and some machinery and
mechanical appliances."o30 Under the NAFTA, nearly seventy five percent of
all of the classified products are required to undergo the CTCh or the CTH
tests to be conferred the "originating status." In addition, nine percent and
thirteen percent of them must comply with VC requirements and specific
manufacturing operation.' 3 The effect of such stringent RoO was reflected in
Mexican exports to the U.S. at which the average of their utilization of the
NAFTA preferences was law.13 2
1. Automobiles
One of the stringent NAFTA RoO concerns automobiles at which a
high RVC requirement of 62.5% is imposed on "automotive goods" to be
calculated by using the net cost method. 133 In that case, the CTH test was not
enough to be solely applied without the VC requirement rule.1 34 The aim of
imposing such a stringent NAFTA Rule of origin is to prevent foreign auto
manufacturers (mainly Japanese, Korean and German) from competing with
those of the U.S.: by impelling the former, if seeking the preferences, to source
inputs from inside of the region,'13 which is deemed to be a difficult task for
them to do,136 by trying to make them hence unable to comply with the VC
requirement and by attempting to prevent them thus from acquiring the
preferences, contrary to the American automotive industry that is able to
comply and acquire accordingly the preferences.13 7
The weightiness of the NAFTA RoO for mainly the U.S. automobile
industry is manifested in the "pressure" of the latter for them and in the long
containment of such rules in the agreement which is approximately 200
pages.1
12 9 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 124, at ch. 4, art. 405.
130 Estevadeordal, supra note 47, at 18.
13' Chase, supra note 14, at 21.
132 Estevadeordal, supra note 47, at 7.
3 RVC = Net cost - Value of non Originating Materials/ Net cost x 100. See North
American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 124, at ch. 4, art. 402(3).
114 See id., at ch. 4, art. 403.
1 In case they seek complying with the RVC requirements to acquire
consequently the preferences.
136 Because beside the large amount of capital needed to establish in the region and
invest there, the emulators will have to source from the region inputs that could be
less efficient if compared to those they might have used to source from.
137 See Chase, supra note 14, at 34.
138 Kala Krishna, Rules of Origin 3 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished article, available at
http://econ.1a.psu.edu/-kkrishna/ROOS.pdf).
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The pressure for the imposition of the stringent RoO concerning
automotive products has been largely carried by the U.S. "automakers"
Chrysler and Ford and U.S. "[a]uto parts makers." 39 Even though the
imposition of the 62.5% RVC rule was pre-described as being high and is
considered to be so, Chrysler and Ford sought the imposition of "a higher"
RVC of about seventy percent in order to guard themselves more from their
"foreign" rivals. 14 0
2. Ketchup
Another protectionist NAFTA rule of origin is the one that says, "A
change to tariff item 2103.20.aa from any other chapter, except from
subheading 2002.90."4' This rule grants the originating status for the ketchup
(2103.20) that is produced from imported tomatoes (any other chapter).
However, the rule does not allow for a ketchup to be manufactured from a
tomato paste that is not sourced regionally (2002.90).142 Otherwise, the
ketchup will not be granted the originating status and will not be hence
exported regionally under preferences. In that case, producing ketchup, the
fulfillment of CTC test will be useless under the NAFTA, if the usage of
imported tomato paste from outside of the region is going to take place when
producing the ketchup.
Truly, the specified stringent rule of origin is imposed to induce the
regional ketchup producers to source the needed paste from Mexican tomato
paste producers rather than from those of Chile who sell it at a cheaper price
due to efficiency.14 3 Therefore, the whole rule has been used as a protectionist
apparatus: to protect the previous mentioned Mexicans against competition
from cheaper imported ketchup from Chile.
3. The Triple Transformation under NAFTA
One of the facts that proves the stringency of NAFTA RoO is the
imposition of the triple transformation rule on apparel products "that are made
' Vivian C. Jones & Michael F. Martin, International Trade and Rules of Origin:
Implications of Globalized Manufacturing, CONG. REP. SERVICE 9 (June 10, 2008)
(quoting FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART
OF POLITICAL ANALYsIS 157-58 (1998)).
140Id
141 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 124, at Annex 401, ch. 21.
142 Such exception is known as the "negative test", at which satisfying the CTC will
not grant the originating status to the product, if the exception is not respected. See
Brenton, supra note 128, at 20.
143 Id. It is to be noted that, Canada was allowed to use imported Chilean tomato
paste when producing ketchup needed to be exported then to the U.S. under the
Canada - U.S. Free Trade Agreement preferences. Too bad, this is not the case now
in NAFTA, as explained. See Asian Development Bank, supra note 51, at 52.
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of cotton or man-made fibers." Such a rule is typically used as usual for
protectionist purposes,'" i.e. to protect the North American materials
producers from foreign competition (mainly Asian) by encouraging the
regional apparel producers to source the materials needed for producing
apparels from North America instead of Asia'4 5 (where efficient producers
are) ...14
Pursuant to the NAFTA triple transformation rule, with an exception
to the seven percent de minimis provided under the agreement, all of the
apparel production processes must take place regionally, i.e. in North America.
It is as if a 100% RVC requirement is imposed on apparel products.147
"Rules of origin should be objective, understandable and
predictable." 4 8 In addition to the fact that the triple transformation rule is
stringent, it is exceedingly complicated.149 Consequently, it makes it hard for
many traders and producers to grasp, and comply with it, especially those who
are trying to run a production firm and who are involved in trade for the first
time.
As in the AGOA, the U.S. clothing industry was the one that pressed
for the application of the triple transformation rule in the NAFTA.'50 One of
the primary reasons for this ' ' was to provide the U.S. clothing production
firms that relocated to Mexico (to take advantage of the inexpensive labor)15 2
with U.S. materials without giving them the option to use instead imported
'"See Mariana C. Silveira, Rules of Origin in International Treaties: Comparative
Study of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, and a General Overview of the European
Union 56 (1999) (LL.M. Thesis, University of Arizona), available at
http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/tesmari.htm.
145Stefano Inama, Rules of Origin in International Trade 18, ASIAN DEV. BANK,
2004, available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2004/Intensive-Rules-
Origin/text-inama-1.pdf.
'" Rupa Duttagupta & Arvind Panagariya, Free Trade Areas and Rules of Origin:
Economics and Politics 26 (Int'l Monetary Fund ,IMF Working Paper No. 03/229,
Nov. 2003).
147 Id.
148 Agreement on Rules of Origin, Uruguay, Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Article 9(c) (Sept. 20, 1986) (Uruguay).
149 Jones, supra note 139, at 7.
so Harilal, supra note 24, at 20.
'51 The word "one" is mentioned because avoiding trade deflection could be
another reason for the application of the triple transformation rule. However, such
reason is usually used as an excuse for the application of stringent RoO.
152See Michael G. Wilson, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Gauging
Its Impact on the U.S. Economy, Heritage Lecture, Sept. 27, 1993,
http://www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/HL468.cfn.
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Asian materials when producing apparel needed to be exported under the
NAFTA.15 1
According to the statistics shown by the following chart, the
stringency of the imposed NAFTA triple transformation rule is reflected in a
decline that is apparent in the value of the apparel products exported to the
U.S. under the NAFTA beginning from 2000 until 2006.
14,000
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I2 The "value" of the apparel
products exported to the 134
U.S. undertheNAFTAin 12,107 11,818 11,058 10,879 10,091 &963
U S. million dollars
Source: Author's calculations based on data from Ahmad (2007).154
Unless flexible NAFTA RoO are going to be imposed on apparel
products, the value of the latter that are imported to the U.S. under the
agreement will keep on declining year by year. Hence, the imposition of
flexible NAFTA RoO on apparel products is needed in order to increase the
intra-NAFTA trade in apparel.
4. Article 303 of the NAFTA vs. Article)OK7Vof the GATT
The complexity and the vigorous protectionism of the NAFTA are not
only reflected in its stringent RoO, but also in another module.
"The purpose of . .. a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other
contracting parties with such territories" 5 5 .Such GATT principles have been
violated by Article 303 (Restrictions on Drawback and Duty Deferral
Programs) of the NAFTA.
153 M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, INDUSTRY TRADE EFFECTS RELATED TO NAFTA
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS RL31386 at 8 (2002).
154 Ahmed, supra note 48, at 17.
1ss General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 35.
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Before stating how the GATT principles have been violated, it is
worth mentioning the meaning of the terms "duty drawback" and "duty
deferral." The former is the reimbursement of customs duties paid upon the
importation of inputs that will be used in producing a finished product that is
going to be exported. The latter takes place when the payment of customs
duties upon the importation of inputs is put off until the finished product that is
produced by using the inputs becomes ready to be used up locally.
"Alternatively, if the finished products are exported, no import duties are ever
paid"' 56 which is regarded then as a trade facilitation for both of the importers
and the exporters.
According to Article 303 of the NAFTA, none of the NAFTA
contracting parties are allowed to give back, forgo or lower its "customs
duties" that are payable upon the importation of a third country's materials, if
such materials are going to be used in producing a final product that will be
exported to any of the rest NAFTA contracting parties under the NAFTA
preferences. Therefore, third countries' suppliers, especially those who used to
provide any of the NAFTA contracting parties with fine and inexpensive
materials, are not taking advantages because the article"' has been
discouraging the North American importers to import materials from external
sources of supply. In addition, taking away the duty drawback benefit from
regional importers is taking away a regional trade facilitation tool. This caused
hence article 303 to become a barrier to the trade of third countries with the
region, to become an anti-intra-regional trade facilitation mean and to become
consequently in breach of the previously mentioned GATT article principles.
Basically, Article 303 aims at preventing Mexico from providing
programs that facilitate the importation of the inputs its producers need when
producing a final product that is desired to be exported to Canada and/or the
U.S. under the NAFTA preferences. Hereby, Article 303 became a
controversial issue. On one hand, it might be aiming at encouraging the
Mexican final goods producers to use domestic inputs when producing the
finished products they need to export under the NAFTA. On the other hand, it
might be aiming also at preventing "unfair competition" from being triggered
between the Mexican producers who benefit from the drawback and duty
deferral programs and those of the rest NAFTA parties who do not benefit as
the former'5 when producing the same goods.'"
156 Carlos Angulo-Parra, Edmundo Elias-Fernandez & Carol S. Osmond, Mexico:
Maquiladoras and NAFTA Beyond Year 2000, NAT'L LAW CTR. FOR INTER-AM.
FREE TRADE, (1996), http://www.natlaw.com/treaties/spmxcu4.htm.
5 Edith H. Castafieda, Rules of Origin as Obstacles to International Trade: The
Case ofNAFTA 19 (N. Am. Consortium on Legal Educ. 2008), available at
http://www.nacle.org/students/student-paper-competition/2008-winners.html.
For example, the U.S. does not have any "program" that is tantamount to
Maquiladora (which is a program that will be illustrated next). See id. at 26.
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The first mentioned aim is not an excuse because why would a
country's producer need to import inputs from an outsider (or external)
supplier, if she can source in its country efficient inputs?
The second specified aim, of preventing unfair competition, also does
not make sense. One plausible solution to overcome the so-called "unfair
competition" was to have applied duty drawback rules in all of the relevant
North American territories and thus make things easier for all of the regional
importers.
Even if the intention of Article 303 is to realize the two mentioned
aims, the consequences of doing so are harsh on third countries since their
exportation to NAFTA parties - primarily Mexico - is hindered. For instance,
Maquiladora (or Maquila)160 is a Mexican firm that is regarded, according to
the NAFTA, as a duty deferral program.' 6 ' Maquiladora imported third
countries' inputs "duty free" in order to piece them together and use them to
produce or fix up a final product that will typically be exported. 6 2 On January
1, 2001, the importation of third countries' inputs duty-free under Maquiladora
and using them in producing a final product that is aimed to be exported to the
U.S. and/or Canada under the NAFTA came to an end by the
agreement.' 63Whatever the case may be, inputs imported from third countries
under Maquiladora are allowed to be used in producing a finished product that
will be sold domestically in Mexico.'6"
The consequences of Article 303 of the NAFTA on Maquiladora were
severe. In 2001, about 253 Maquiladoras were closed. Moreover, 250,000
workers lost their positions.'6 ' According to Sargent, "NAFTA article 303,
and modifications in various international agreements have all contributed to
the loss of over a quarter of a million Maquiladora jobs." 66
's
9 Id. at 19-20.
160 It is known also as the Border Industrialization Program. Maquila Properties,
Inc., http://www.maquilaproperties.com/maquilaoverviewl998.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009).
161 Angulo-Parra, supra note 156, at 678.
162 Univ. of Delaware, http://www.udel.edu/leipzig/texts2/vox128.htm (last visited
A r. 1, 2009).
16 Jesus Caflas & Roberto Coronado, Maquiladora Industry: Past, Present and
Future, 2 EL PASO Bus. FRONTIER (2002), available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/busfront/bus0202.html. See also Jim Gerber,
Whither the Maquiladora? A Look at the Growth Prospects for the Industry After
2001 2 (San Diego Dialogue, Working Paper #E-99-1, 1999), available at
http://www.sandiegodialogue.org/pdfs/Maquila%20doc.pdf
'" PATRICK J. KELLY, MEXICO MAQUILADORAS AND NAFTA (2001),
http://www.fredlaw.com/articles/international/intl 0103_pjk.html.
161 Villarreal, supra note 153, at 13.
' John Sargent, Charter Evolution in Maquiladoras: A Case Study ofReynosa,
Tamaulipas 1 (The Univ. of Texas-Pan Am., Ctr. of Border Econ. Studies,
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"No nation was ever ruined by trade" 67 - that is because trade is a
gateway to welfare. The more regional parties facilitate trade, the more they
witness a growth in their welfare, and vice versa. However, the use of stringent
RoOs as protectionist apparatuses in the NAFTA region is hindering the
achievement of economic welfare. This is clarified in many product sectors,
as formerly indicated. For the aforementioned reasons, it is thus necessary to
impose neutral and flexible RoO in the NAFTA in an effort to facilitate trade
between its constituent parties and to overcome the complexities most of the
North American producers and traders are facing.
E. How to Get Rid OfAll Imposed Protectionist RoO
As the previous illustrations demonstrate, RoOs have been used as
protectionist apparatuses in both preferential and non-preferential trade
schemes.
The noncompliance of WTO member states with status quo and the
application of RoO that suit the interests and protect the susceptible goods of
the countries that designed them reflect the usage of the rules as protectionist
devices. This makes things complex for traders and producers all over the
world in that it: (1) increases the number of international trade disputes; (2)
reduces the utilization proportions of preferences in regional trade areas; and
(3) undermines global competition. As a direct result, consumers worldwide
are left with few choices and international trade (intra-regional and trade with
third countries) is hindered. These unintended consequences go against many
of the GATT and the WTO ARoO principles. Finally, as exemplified in
Lesotho, the imposition of flexible RoO has been proven to spread welfare.
The employment of RoO as protectionist devices exists in many
preferential and non-preferential trade regimes. This section examines the
most popular agreements and systems in order to prove the issue of
protectionism. The U.S. - India dispute, the EU GSP, The SADC, The AGOA
and the NAFTA arejust models used to clarify how the imposition of stringent
RoO, as the double transformation rule, and too stringent ones, as the triple
transformation rule, has been used to pursue protectionist purposes..
Based on the previous analysis and clarifications, the following solutions
are suggested to be carried out in order to prevent the application of any
protectionist rule of origin:
- Calculating the production capability of RTAs contracting parties, by
gathering statistics and information about their established capacities
Working Paper No. #2003-16, 2003), available at
http://ea.panam.edu/cbest/pdf/sl6.pdf.
167 The attributed quote belongs to Benjamin Franklin. Famousquotes.com,
http://www.famousquotes.com/show/1004655/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
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and by knowing to what range they use such capacities, and imposing
accordingly the RTAs RoO.
- Or the harmonization of preferential and non-preferential RoO.
Complying with the second suggested solution is the most efficient way to
avoid the issue of using RoO as protectionist instruments.'6 ' Doing so would:
(1) cease the freedom of countries to use RoO in a disguised way to protect
their own national interests and susceptible goods; (2) ensure the objectivity,
predictability and transparency of RoO; (3) eliminate the variation in such
rules across agreements and countries; (4) reduce the number of international
trade disputes; (5) increase the utilization proportions of preferences in
regional trade areas; (6) foster a global environment of fair competition; and
(7) provide consumers all over the world with choices. As a result,
international trade would be facilitated and welfare would spread worldwide.
Under this strategy, the aims of the GATT and the WTO ARoO fundamentals
would successfully be realized without being breached.
168 See the harmonization issue in part D.
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III. ROO AS TRIGGERS TO TRADE DIVERSION
"[T]he higher the threshold established in the rules of origin, the greater the
chance that trade diversion will take place." 69
Source: Author's analysis.
Trade diversion transpires when a regional importer diverts its
importation of goods from an efficient outsider source of supply to an
inefficient internal one (source of supply located inside of the regional trade
169 Anne 0. Krueger, Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of
Origin, in TRADE, THEORY, AND ECONOMETRICS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN C.
CHIPMAN 91-101 (James R. Melvin et al. eds., 1999) (citing WILLIAM H. COOPER,
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.
TRADE POLICY 8 (2008)).
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area). As such, trade diversion negatively affects "global efficiency" in that it
widens the "production" of inefficient regional trade area "producers" and
shrinks the production of efficient third countries producers. 7 0 Consequently,
the imposition of trade-diverting RoO negatively affects global efficiency and
begs the question: How can RoO divert trade?
The imposition of stringent RoO in preferential trade regimes results
in trade diversion when a regional final goods producer alters its importation
of intermediate goods from an efficient outsider intermediate goods supplier to
a less efficient internal one in order to comply with the RTA stringent RoO...
It must also be noted that trade diversion does not only happen
because of the imposition of stringent RTA RoO; it also takes place as a result
to the imposition of trade barriers, such as a country's "external tariffs""'
(illustrated later in this part).
A. Trade-diverting RoO and a Double Loss in Welfare vs. Trade
Creation and GATT Principles
"Trade creates jobs and lifts people out of poverty";'7 2 but, this raises
the question: how is trade created? Trade is created regionally when the
formation of a RTA causes a regional importer to shift its importation of goods
to an efficient internal source of supply from a less efficient external one.
Trade creation is the opposite of trade diversion. It boosts welfare regionally
once it takes place there subsequent to the formation of a RTA.
The number of any FTA or CU members is of a considerable relation
with trade diversion and trade creation. If a large number of countries become
members of a FTA or a CU, there is a greater chance of the existence of
efficient goods producers within the regional trade area leading regionally
somewhat to trade creation and to the avoidance of trade diversion, and vice
versa.'73 For these reasons, if countries all over the world are members in a
worldwide FTA, trade diversion will never find a way to exist. In that case,
imagining of course the formation of a global CU would be ridiculous because
if countries across the globe are all members in the CU, to which country's
goods the common global external tariff would be applied?
170 Robert Z. Lawrence, Regionalism and the WTO: Should the Rules be Changed?,
in THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 52 ( Jeffrey J. Schott ed.,
1996), available at
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapterspreview/66/3iie2350.pdf
See also Asian Development Bank, supra note 51, at 9.
171 See Krueger, supra note 33, at 4.
172 The attributed quote belongs to Dennis Hastert. BrainyQuote,
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/dennishastert2.html (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009).
173 North Carolina Cooperative Extension,
http://www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/agecon/trade/eight.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
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The formation of a "global" FTA might best be achieved by
establishing a simple single FTA. The more sizable countries join such FTA,
the more third countries will yearn to become members. This desire will
ultimately lead to the formation of a global FTA. As a result, trade will
flourish all over the world and welfare will spread worldwide.174
Source: Author's analysis.
Based on the all of the pre-indicated arguments of this part, the
imposition of trade-diverting RoO in a RTA negatively affects the "economic
welfare"'17 of third countries and does not facilitate their trade with the
174 Soamiely Andriamananjara, Remarks at the PECC Trade Forum Meetings at the
Institute for International Economics 3 (Apr. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.pecc.org/publications/papers/trade-papers/1_SII/6-
andriamananjara.PDF.
17 Cooper, supra note 169, at 8.
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regional trade area since it obstructs efficient third countries' suppliers from
providing the regional final goods producers with intermediate products,
unless any of the latter decide to forgo the RTA preferences, and trade
regionally on MFN grounds to maintain its importation of intermediate goods
from the efficient outsider suppliers. On the other hand, applying the trade-
diverting RoO in a RTA does not facilitate intra-regional trade, and further
lessens the economic welfare of the RTA contracting parties since the rules
induce the regional final goods producers to source regionally costly inputs
when they could have sourced cheaper ones from outside suppliers instead.
Hereby, the application of trade-diverting RoO in preferential trade regimes
violates the principles of article XXIV (4) of the GATT 1947176 because
pursuant to such article paragraph, the formation of RTAs "should be to
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to
the trade of other contracting parties with such territories."l77
B. The Relation Between the Imposition ofProtectionist RoO and
Trade Diversion
The indicated example in the previous part (RoO as protectionist
apparatuses) concerning ketchup is an example of an occurred case of trade
diversion, where the imposition of the stringent NAFTA rule of origin for
ketchup aims at driving North American ketchup producers to source the
needed tomato paste from protected Mexican tomato paste producers, rather
than from the more efficient paste producers of Chile.178 That is why there is a
quiet relation between using RoO as protectionist devices and the occurrence
of trade diversion.
Since the imposition of a protectionist rule of origin in a RTA
endeavors to protect a regional intermediate goods supplier from competition
from a more efficient outsider supplier by causing a shift in the regional
importation of intermediate goods to the former from the latter, all RTAs
protectionist RoO are trade-diverting, and thus negatively affecting the global
efficiency. Many examples other than the mentioned ketchup rule of origin
clarify the absolute relation between the imposition of stringent, protectionist
RoO and the occurrence of trade diversion. The following subparts illustrate
additional examples.
1. North America vs. Asia
Again regarding NAFTA and its stringent, protectionist, triple
transformation rule of origin is imposed to mainly induce the North American
apparel producers to source the materials needed for producing apparels from
176 See Vermulst, supra note 6, atl6.
177General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 35, art. XXIV(4).
178 Brenton, supra note 128, at 20.
Rules of Origin as International Trade Hindrances
North America instead of Asia. 179  Once the North American apparel
producers source the materials they need regionally - rather than from Asia,
where apparel materials providers are more efficient - trade diversion takes
place.
In point of fact, a diversion of North American apparel imports,
following the formation of the NAFTA, from efficient Asian supplierso80 to
Mexico took place, which led to a reduction in the Chinese and the Indian
apparel exports to the U.S. and Canada. Consequently, Mexico acquired a
considerable "market share" in both Canada and the U.S. concerning its
apparel "exports" to the markets of both of the latter NAFTA members.' 8 '
This explicates the role of the imposed triple transformation rule in protecting
North American apparel materials producers and diverting trade to them
because of their being less efficient than those of Asia (mainly Chinese and
Indian producers).
Not only Asian countries, but also Caribbean ones have declared that
the NAFTA stringent RoO imposed on the apparels and automobiles sectors
are causing trade diversion. 82
2. Mexico vs. the Caribbean and Central America
During the parley of the NAFTA in 1990, many non-NAFTA
members indicated that a diversion of trade to the NAFTA parties from the
former would take place, although plenty of the third countries' goods are
more efficient than those of the NAFTA members. In addition, even Mexico
clarified that the trade diversion that could be caused by the NAFTA is of a
crucial significance since the substitution of the Mexican importation of cheap
goods from non-NAFTA members by the Mexican importation of costly ones
179 Inama, supra note 145, at 18. Richard Eckaus of M.I.T. and Robert Scott of the
University of Maryland proved also that trade diversion has taken place in North
America concerning the apparels sector subsequent to the formation of the NAFTA
(citing Arvind Panagariya, The Regionalism Debate: An Overview, 22 WORLD
EcoN. 477-511 (1999)).
180 WORLD BANK, NAFTA AND TRADE FLOWS OF NONMEMBER COUNTRIES 16
(2003), http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/north/
NAFTA%20Lessons%20Chapter/o206%20Trade%20Diversion.pdf.
'
8 
'T.N. Srinivasan, Presentation at the Asian Economic Outlook Workshop 9-10
(Nov. 2001), available at
http://www.econ.yale.edul-srinivas/PrefTradeAgreements.pdf
182 GEORGE HOLLIDAY, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS 13 (1997), available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/97-
663_19971212.pdf.
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under the NAFTA from the U.S. and/or Canada would lead to forfeiture in the
Mexican financial takings. 83
Subsequent to the formation of the NAFTA, the aggregate clothing
exports of Caribbean and Central American countries to North America
became less than that of Mexico to the rest of its NAFTA contracting
parties.
According to the current sources of information, the NAFTA
preferential treatment is not accountable for the regional shift of clothing
importation from Caribbean and Central American countries to Mexico. This
proves that the imposition of the NAFTA stringent apparel RoO was possibly,
to a considerable extent, the cause of the specified diversion in the North
American Free Trade Area.18 5
The following chart compares the allocations of Mexico, Central
America and the CARICOM'86 in the North American Free Trade Area total
apparel imports prior and subsequent to the formation of the NAFTA until
2001.
Pursuant to the statistics included in the chart, trade diversion did take
place in the North American Free Trade Area because the aggregate Mexican
clothing exports to the region before the formation of the NAFTA was less
than that of the Central American and Caribbean countries, and contrary to
what the situation came to be after the formation of the agreement, where the
overall Mexican clothing exports to the region became higher than that of its
two aforementioned rivals.
'
8 3 DANIEL LEDERMAN, WILLIAM F. MALONEY & Luis SERVEN, LESSONS FROM
NAFTA FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: A SUMMARY OF
RESEARCH FINDINGS 16 (2003), available at
http://Inweb90.worldbank.org/CAW/Cawdoclib.nsf/0/BC1B10FC1 7938F3B85256
C5E00691BOO/$file/NAFTA+Introduction+Executive+Summary_+PO77128.pdf .
'
8 Id. at 17.
..s Id. at 16. It is to be noted that, the formation of RTAs, the imposition of
external tariffs to only non-RTAs members, and the accordance of the RTAs
preferences to only the RTA parties could lead to trade diversion, as well as the
imposition stringent RoO in RTAs. This will be illustrated later in this part of the
paper.
1 The CARICOM consists of fifteen member states. They are; Antigua and
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. There is also the CARICOM
Single Market. More information about the CARICOM member states and the
CARICOM Single Market is available at Caribbean Community Secretariat
website. Caribbean Community Secretariat,
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/member-states.jsp?menu=community (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009).
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Source: Author's calculations based on The World Bank (2003).
The CBTPA (or the CBI 1t 7) of 200018 allows many "Caribbean, and
Central and South American countries"189 to export apparel to the U.S. duty
and quota free. 190 However, to enjoy such preferences, the apparel must be
produced in compliance with the CBTPA rule of origin for apparel before
being exported to the U.S.1 91
According to the stated origin rule, the apparel has to be "cut in a
CBI country from U.S. fabric made from U.S. yarn and assembled there with
U.S. thread." 192 Therefore, the rule is of a triple transformation nature as that
1 8 7 INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, GUIDE TO THE CARIBBEAN
BASIN INITIATIVE 1 (2000), available at
http://trade.gov/media/Publications/pdf/cbi2000.pdf.
188 The CBTPA was the CBERA in 1983. See J. F. HORNBECK, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, U.S. TRADE POLICY AND THE CARIBBEAN: FROM TRADE PREFERENCES TO
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (2007), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/82982.pdf. More information is also available at Caribbean Basin
Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA). American Apparel & Footwear Association,
http://www.apparelandfootwear.org/LegislativeTradeNews/CBTPA.asp#Frequent
%20Questions (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
189 WORLD BANK, supra note 180, at 36. The number of beneficiaries is 24:
Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and British
Virgin Islands. U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE TRADE
COMMUNITY SHOULD KNow ABOUT: THE U.S.-CARIBBEAN BASIN TRADE
PARTNERSHIP ACT 1 (2001), available at
http://www.apparelandfootwear.org/pdf/cbtpaguide.pdf.
190 WORLD BANK, supra note 180, at 36.
191 See id192 NATHAN ASSOCIATES INC., RULES OF ORIGIN: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
3 (2003), available at http://pdfdec.org/pdf docs/PNACS144.pdf. See also
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of the NAFTA and the AGOA. This reflects the extent to which the U.S.
apparel industry lobbies for the application of the triple transformation rule of
origin in the autonomous and contractual trade agreements to which the U.S. is
a party. However, a deeper meditation on the CBTPA triple transformation
rule will prove that it is more restrictive than that of the NAFTA. Even though
the latter is also restrictive, it permits sourcing the yarn from any NAFTA
contracting party, "not only the U.S."l 9 3 As a result, a diversion of North
American apparel imports from the CBI countries to Mexico took place, taking
into consideration that Caribbean apparel "producers" are "more efficient"
than those of Mexico.194
The next chart shows the "percent of apparel exports to the U.S." in
specific years under the "CBTPA and NAFTA preferences."' 95
Although the Caribbean apparel producers are more efficient than
those of Mexico, the latter's apparel exports to the U.S. were increasingly
more than those of the CBI countries (a case of trade diversion).
It is to be noted that although the CBTPA was enacted in 2000, the
year 1995 is included in the chart to represent what the situation was like
during the enforcement period of the CBERA program, which became the
CBTPA in 2000.
SANDLER, TRAvis &AND ROSENBERG, P.A., CARIBBEAN/SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
TRADE BILL PASSES IN HOUSE (2000), available at
http://www.apparelandfootwear.org/ pdf/cbi.pdf.
193 WORLD BANK, supra note 180, at 36.
194 HOLLIDAY, supra note 182, at 9; see also WORLD BANK, supra note 180, at 16.
Dean also indicated that the NAFTA, following its formation in 1994, reduced the
impacts of the CBERA program by causing trade and investment diversion. See
JuDITH M. DEAN, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, Do PREFERENTIAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROMOTE GROwTH? AN EVALUATION OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
EcONOMIC RECOVERY ACT 4 (2002), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/ecO2O7a.pdf.
195 WORLD BANK, supra note 180, at 36.
Rules of Origin as International Trade Hindrances
L Mexico 30% 61% 1 69% 74%l3 CBI Countries 0% 2% 54% 65%
Source: Author's calculations based on World Bank (2003).
If the imposition of the RoO in the CBTPA were more flexible than
that in the NAFTA, no trade diversion would have occurred. However,
implementing this would have been unfair to Mexican apparel producers
because they would have faced two kinds of obstacles. The first is complying
with the stringently imposed NAFTA triple transformation rule of origin and
the second is the possible occurrence of a great flow in the amount of CBI
countries' apparel exports to the U.S. that would have been too competitive for
the Mexican apparel producers to handle. That is why harmonizing the RoO as
implemented in the NAFTA and the CBTPA, even in the sectors of sensitive
products, is a simple, fair solution that could have overcome the illustrated
trade diversion problem. If it was applied, for example, by imposing the triple
transformation rule of origin in the CBTPA in a manner similar to the way the
rule is imposed in the NAFTA, where yams could be allowed to be sourced
from any CBTPA contracting party rather than just the U.S., the problem could
have been avoided.'96
If the country of an importer is a member of two RTAs and both of
their imposed RoO are all, or even in specific sectors, harmonized, the
exportation of goods from the most efficient supplier inside either of the two
regional trade areas to the importer will take place. Accordingly, if the
CBTPA- and the NAFTA-imposed apparel RoO were harmonized, the
Caribbean apparel exports to the U.S. could have been increased above those
of Mexico to the U.S. since Caribbean apparel producers are more efficient
than those of Mexico. Consequently, no trade diversion would have occurred
and the Mexican apparel producers could have had the ability to compete
fairly with those of the CBI countries with regard to exportation of apparel to
the U.S.
196 It would have been much better, of course, if a more flexible rule of origin was
imposed on apparel products in both of the NAFTA and the CBTPA.
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3. The EU vs. China
As clarified in the previous part, the imposition of the double
transformation rule of origin in the EU preferential trade agreements aims
mainly at encouraging the regional apparel producers to source the materials
they need from EU suppliers rather than from more efficient outsider
providers, such as those of China. Thus, trade diversion has been taking place
because of the EU's practice of imposing the stringent, protectionist, trade-
diverting double transformation rule.' 97
C. Trade Diversion and the Transshipment of Goods
1. FTAs
The transshipment (or trade deflection) of goods via a FTA member
imposing the least external MFN tariff onto another member could happen, if
lax RoO are imposed in the FTA. That is why stringent RoO are usually
imposed in FTAs: to prevent the mentioned problem from taking place,
leading, unfortunately, to a case of trade diversion. Nevertheless, if the FTA
contracting parties lower their external MFN tariffs, their incentives to impose
stringent RoO in the FTA would be undermined because following the MFN
tariff reductions, transshippers would not be induced to transship their goods
from a contracting party to the FTA imposing a liberal external MFN tariff to
another party imposing a liberal one as well. As a result, trade diversion that
happens because of the imposition of stringent RTA RoO would not find a
way to occur within the free trade area since the FTA RoO would be flexible,
which would, to a considerable extent, allow the regional finished goods
producers to source the inputs they need from the most efficient third
countries' intermediate goods suppliers; to produce thereof final products that
could be exported regionally under the FTA preferences. 98
197 Brenton, supra note 56, at 14-15.
198 See Asian Development Bank, supra note 51, at 5. It is clarified there "that
countries forming free trade areas should be required to reduce MFN tariff rates to
offset" the "tendency" of trade diversion.
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The Simple FTAs Anti-Trade Diversion and Pro-welfare spreading
Equation
Liberalizing the external MFN tariff of the FTAs each contracting party
(--+* A reduced inducement for transshipment --) The imposition of
flexible FTAs RoO) = A confrontation" to trade diversion + A
propagation in welfare.
* Stands for "would lead to."
In the previous indicated equation, the word "no" could have been
written instead of the word "reduced," but this would not have been wise
because even though the reduction of the external MFN tariffs of a FTA
contracting parties reduces the incentives of transshippers to practice
transshipment within the free trade area, the latter could, however, still
transship goods via the FTA contracting party with the least external lowered
MFN tariff to another party. A nice solution to avoid the occurrence of such a
problem is to impose a common "external tariff" between the FTA contracting
parties and to make such tariff reach the extent of the one least imposed by one
of parties on the good.. Hence, the FTA will be changed to a CU.2 00 Thus that
proves that CUs are more efficient than FTAs in avoiding the problem of
transshipment.
2. CUs
Eschewing trade deflection is not that complicated when it comes to a
CU because, as formerly clarified, the imposition of the CU "common external
tariff' plays a crucial role in preventing the deflection from happening within
the region. However, the application of divergent "national trade rules," such
as "anti-dumping and countervailing" duties, by each contracting party to a CU
could lead to the occurrence of trade deflection. That is why harmonizing the
national trade rules among the CUs contracting parties are required.2 0 1
Trade diversion does not only happen because of the imposition of
stringent RTA RoO since it also takes place as a result of the imposition of
trade barriers, such as a country's external tariffs. Here comes the part about
lowering the external MIFN tariffs of the RTAs member countries in
countering trade diversion.
199 The term "the elimination of" could have been written instead of the term "A
confrontation of' but since trade diversion does not only take place because of the
application of stringent RTA RoO, its total elimination cannot be accomplished if
only RoO are taken into account. Accordingly, the term "A confrontation to" is
written.
2 Duttagupta, supra note 146, at 17-18.
20 1Ghoneim, supra note 49, at 598. See also Srinivasan, supra note 181, at 21 (for
the harmonization of such policies).
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D. Encountering Trade Diversion by Reducing the External MFN
Tariff and How to Kill Three Birds with One Stone:
Supposedly, if RoO are not imposed in a FTA, the exportation of
products to the region will be directed mainly to the member state with the
smallest external tariff.202
According to Viner,203 although the liberalization of tariffs among the
member countries of a RTA expands trade between them by encouraging the
regional sourcing of goods, it diverts trade from an external cheap source of
supply to an internal expensive one.2 04 In other words, following the
formation of a RTA, the tariff liberalization among the RTA members makes
the intra-regional trade less expensive than the extra-regional trade and outfits
the regional sources of supply with "a price advantage." This encourages the
regional importers to source costly goods from inefficient internal suppliers
and discourages them simultaneously from importing cheap ones from
efficient outsider suppliers, which is contrary to the situation that occurred
prior to the formation of the RTA, thus leading to a case of trade diversion.20 5
Lowering the external MFN tariffs of the RTA's contracting parties would
give rise to "a more level playing field for intra- and extra-"RTA sources of
supply, 206 and would help in preserving the trade of third countries with the
RTA's members, and would consequently confront trade diversion.207
By lessening the regional trade liberalization among RTA contracting
parties step-by-step, the price advantage given to the regional suppliers
gradually would cease to exist and the regional importers consequently would
be induced to source from efficient outside sources of supply rather from the
inefficient regional ones, probably leading to an outcome of no trade diversion.
That is why "the less trade liberalization exists among constituents of a" RTA,
"the less trade diversion will take place" 208 and vice versa, albeit the fact that
liberalizing the regional trade by the elimination of some internal trade
restrictions could create trade within the regional trade area.
202 Duttagupta, supra note 146, at 17.
203 JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS ISSUE (1950).
204 Duttagupta, supra note 146, at 9-10.
205 To see an example illustrating such point, see ROBERT LAWRENCE,
REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM AND DEEPER INTEGRATION 24-25 (1996).
206 Agustin Carstens, Speech at the 20th Annual General Meeting and Conference
of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists (Jan. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2005/011205.htm.
207 Petros C. Mavroidis, IfI Don't Do It, Somebody Else Will (or won't) Testing the
Compliance of Preferential Trade Agreements with the Multilateral Rules, 40 J.
WORLD TRADE 187, 191 (2006), available at
http://www.ycsg.yale.edu/focus/gta/if idont.pdf.
208 Id. at 39.
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Seeing that the "removal" of certain internal barriers could lead to
trade diversion and seeing that the removal of certain other internal ones could
create trade, evading only the removal of the former has been recommended
by some as a solution to face trade diversion and create trade within all
regional trade areas. However, it is hard to determine which internal barriers
are creating trade and which internal ones are diverting it. Besides, having the
right to decide which barriers should be removed could be used as a
protectionist tool by any of the RTAs contracting parties to protect "politically
powerful producers from outside competition. "2 0 Therefore, lowering the
external MFN tariffs of the RTAs member countries is so far deemed to be the
best solution to confront trade diversion.
Resting on the previous indicated arguments, the author came out with
the following equation:
I* The internal barriers between a RTA contracting parties + The parties'
T** of high external MFN tariffs = Creating trade within the region +
Diverting trade to the region.
* Stands for lowering.
** Stands for maintenance.
The next two figures suppose how trade diversion could take place
because of forming a RTA.
By using three hypothetical countries: A, B and C, the figures
compares between and shows a difference in the trade relationship between a
FTA contracting party and an outsider source of supply prior and subsequent
to the formation of the FTA....
Suppose that the importers of A used to import a product (say X) from
C at a price of $3.40 after paying a $0.40 external MFN tariff. Suppose also,
on the other hand, that the price of producing X in B is $3.20. Hence, the
importation of X from B, at a price of $3.60 (including the payable $0.40
tariff), would have been more costly for A's importers than that from C.
209 HOLLIDAY, supra note 182, atl9. See also Asian Development Bank, supra note
51, at 21.
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Source: Author's analysis.
Once a FTA between A and B (A-B FTA) is formed, the importers of
A would source X from B under preferences-at a price of $3.20-more
cheaply than they would source it from C-at the price of $3.40. Thereupon,
forming the A-B FTA will divert the trade in X from a cheap source of supply
C (producing X locally at the price of $3.00) to a costly one B (producing X
locally at the price of $3.20). Hereby, trade diversion can be noticed by
studying with which countries each contracting party to a RTA was and is
practicing trade in goods prior and subsequent to the formation of the RTA.2 10
210 Mavroidis, supra note 207, at 11.
146 Vol. 5:1
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Source: Author's analysis.
The UK used to import cheap lamb from New Zealand.2 11 However,
when the UK became a member state of the EU, it began to source lamb from
a costly lamb internal supplier-France-because the EUCU "common
external tariff' made the importation of lamb from New Zealand "more
expensive" than the lamb from France.212 The external tariff here was probably
used for protectionist purposes: protecting the French lamb against
competition from cheaper imported lamb from New Zealand.2 13
The UK could have had the ability to source cheap lamb from New
Zealand, despite its entry into the EUCU, if the latter's common external tariff
was reduced to the extent that would not make the importation of lamb from
New Zealand more expensive than that from France. Thus, this would lead to
no trade diversion. That is why there is a necessity for the existence of a
GATT "rule" urging RTAs to "leave outsiders at least as well off as they were
211 PHILIP WHYTE, NARROWING THE ATLANTIC: THE WAY FORWARD FOR EU-US
TRADE AND INVESTMENT (2009).
212 Id. at 23-24
213 See Carstens, supra note 206. Carstens mentions that countries may impose
high extemal MFN tariffs for protectionist purposes.
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before the agreement" by reducing the external MFN tariffs of the RTAs
member countries to a degree that would not cause trade diversion.2 14
For some countries,215 as in Africa, "South Asia and even Central and
Eastern Europe," the imposition of the external MvFN tariff is considered to be
a source of their income. However, if any of those countries is a member of a
RTA and imposes a high external MFN tariff, the importers of such a country
would be induced to source from within the regional trade area under
preferences. Hence, the imposed external MFN tariff would lose its value as a
source of income, and trade diversion would take place within the region,2 16 SO
why the bother and imposing high external tariffs?
Hypothetically, if countries all over the world are assumed to be
members of one FTA, the FTA preferences would be equally provided to all
countries without discrimination, no external tariffs would be imposed
(consequently the discriminatory imposition of tariffs would never happen),
and even the application of preferential RoO would not be necessary anymore.
As a result, none of the efficient producers would be an outsider. Thus,
importers all over the world would be encouraged to import from any efficient
producer, and inefficient producers would not find demands for their goods.
This lack of demand would encourage inefficient producers to increase their
efficiency and that would lead to a real increase in global efficiency. 217
Accordingly, trade diversion would never take place.
The author and Bergsten both suggest the formation of a global
FTA.218 A Heritage Foundation report also calls for the formation of a "Global
Free Trade Association." 2 19 In addition, Hindley stated that "the best rule of
origin would be that which allows every trader to choose the origin that suits
him best. That would typically be origin in the importing country, and would
be tantamount to global free trade"220
214 Lawrence, supra note 170, at 48.
215 Arvind Panagariya, The Regionalism Debate: An Overview, in THE WORLD
ECONOMY 477, 498-99 (1999) ("Africa, South Asia and even Central and Eastern
Europe").
216Id. at 499.
217 It is to be noted then that sometimes the importation of goods from the outside
sources of supply is reduced and shifted to the regional suppliers, not because of
trade diversion, but because of the development in the efficiency of the regional
suppliers.
218Fred C. Bergsten, Open Regionalism (Inst. for Int'l Economic, Working Paper
No.97--3, 1997), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfmn?ResearchlD=l 52.
219 John C. Hulsman & Aaron Schavey, The Global Free Trade Association: A New
Trade Agenda, HERITAGE FOuND. BACKGROUNDER (2001), available at
http://www.heritage.org/research/tradeandforeignaid/bgl441 .cfmn.
220Ghoneim, supra note 49, at 608.
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The trade of a third country with a contracting party to a RTA can be
maintained as well off as it was before the agreement if the former is allowed
to become a member country of the RTA.22 ' This, accordingly, would leave no
room for the usage of the external MFN tariff as a protectionist device, would
not allow for discrimination between the traded goods of internal and efficient
outsider suppliers when it comes to the RTA preferences, would not hence
keep the regional suppliers at a price advantage, would thus keep the regional
importers on sourcing the cheap goods they used to source prior to the
formation of the RTA, would consequently improve the efficiency of the
internal suppliers, would as a result avoid the trade diversion that occurs
following to and because of the formation of RTAs, would create trade within
the regional trade area and would then spread welfare regionally. However,
trade diversion could take place if other efficient external suppliers come into
existence after the formation of the RTA. Possible solutions to this diversion
crisis are the countries of such suppliers joining the RTA and/or lowering the
external MFN tariffs of the RTA member countries.
Pursuant to Panagariya, "binding the external tariff and then bringing
it down to the levels of the preferential tariff is" a great solution to overcome
the problem of trade diversion within all regional trade areas.222 For instance,
if the provided duty-free access under a FTA is applied to the imports from all
third countries until the expiration date of the FTA, the internal importers
would not deal with the external tariff obstacle and would thus be encouraged
to import goods from efficient sources of supply worldwide. Furthermore, the
application of RoO in the FTA would not be necessary because no
transshipment of goods within the free trade area would happen, and if
countries all over the world similarly enjoyed the FTA preferences, there
would be no need to ensure whether the imported good is of a partner origin.
Only non-preferential RoO would be applied for the other four uses of RoO
are: gathering trade statistics, government procurement, carrying out origin
marking and labeling requirements, and the application of trade policy
instruments. As a result, trade diversion would never find a way to take place
within the free trade area.
According to all of the previous arguments, lowering the external
MFN tariffs of the RTAs member countries kills three birds with one stone.
First, it confronts the transshipment of goods problem within all free trade
areas, leading to a reduction in the incentives of their member countries to
impose stringent RoO in the FTAs. Consequently, it avoids the trade diversion
that takes place within free trade areas because of the imposition of stringent
FTAs RoO. Furthermore, it eschews the trade diversion that happens as a
result to the formation of RTAs.
221 HOLLIDAY, supra note 182, at 20.
222 Panagariya, supra note 215, at 508.
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E. The Negative Effects of Article XXV of the GATT 1947
1. Trade Diversion
Based on the arguments in the previous subparts, the formation of a
RTA could lead to trade diversion in two phases that could happen separately
or together. The first phase takes place when the liberalization of tariffs
among the RTA member countries makes the intra-regional trade less
expensive than extra-regional trade. This liberalization of tariffs and trade
outfits the internal suppliers with a rate specialty that the outsider suppliers do
not have because of the imposed external MFN tariffs of the RTA partners.
The second phase occurs when the RTA imposes stringent RoO that divert the
importation of intermediate goods from efficient outsider suppliers to
inefficient internal ones for the regional finished goods producers to satisfy the
RTA stringent RoO and, thus, trade regionally under preferences.
What is common between the first and the second phase is that both of
them take place subsequent to the formation of a RTA. However, trade
diversion in both phases happens because of two different non-
discriminatory2 3 causes. On one hand, the liberalization of tariffs among the
RTA member countries is what causes the diversion in the first phase and is
discriminatory because the liberalization is provided to only the RTA members
and not to third countries. On the other hand, what causes the diversion in the
second phase is the stringent RoO. Such rules are of a discriminative nature
because they are designed to favor internal suppliers of intermediate goods at
the expense of more efficient external ones.
If the formation of a RTA and the consequent liberalization of trade
among only the RTA members is allowed under article XXIV (4) ofthe GATT
1947 as a discriminatory legalized "exception" 224 to the GATT MFN
principle, the GATT does not make an exception for or allow the RTA
contracting parties to discriminate "between" different "sources of' supply by
223 "Non-discrimination takes two forms: non-discriminating among trading
partners; and non-discriminating between domestic and foreign producers or
suppliers. The former is called the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment
principle, while the latter is called the national treatment principle." Hussain H.
Zaidi, Non-discrimination in International Trade, BUS. & FIN. REv., Apr. 23, 2007,
available at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/apr2007-weekly/busrev-23-04-
2007/plO.htm.
224 It is to be noted that there is more than one exception to the MFN principle. The
Enabling Clause of 1979 is another exception besides the illustrated one from
which developing countries are allowed to be accorded autonomously from the
developed ones' preferences through the formation of a GSP.
225 Asian Development Bank, supra note 51, at 5-6.
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imposing stringent, trade-diverting RoO.226 Hereby, the imposition of the
trade-diverting RoO in all preferential trade regimes is of a bias nature and is
hence against the GATT MFN principle.
2. Other Negative Outcomes
Although the signers of the GATT knew that the formation of regional
trade areas under article XXIV of the GATT goes against the GATT MFN
principle, they kept in mind that the mentioned formation would bring
"welfare" to the RTAs member countries by creating trade within the regional
trade areas and by avoiding its diversion therein.2 27 Unfortunately, the
negative outcomes of forming RTAs vary and are not solely reflected in trade
diversion.
Many countries favor the formation of RTAs so as not to comply with
the MFN principle, to protect their interests and to discriminate. In addition,
the imposition of stringent RoO in a RTA could lead to investment diversion
when it induces an outsider-finished goods producer to establish input-
producing facilities in a contracting party to the RTA in order to comply with
the rules, even though the party is not, economically, the optimum spot.22 8
Bhagwati confirmed that FTAs are of a discriminative nature and, as a
result, lead to trade diversion. Furthermore, he stated that industries favor the
formation of FTAs to gain by the provided preferences a rate specialty that
their outsider rivals would not earn. Moreover, he illustrated that the variation
in RoO and "regulations" across FTAs increases the production costs, is
deemed to be a dilemma for "customs administration" and leads to what is
named as the "spaghetti-bowl" incident.229
The formation of a RTA is also detrimental because it diverts the
employment from a high wages RTA member state to a "lower wages"
member of the same RTA (for example, from the U.S. to Mexico regarding the
NAFTA). In addition, it weakens the environmental protection efforts when
the establishment of production factories takes place in a RTA member state
(usually a developing country) that does not have strong "regulations" against
pollution. For instance, the UAW declared that the FTAA,
"[W]ould provide broader protections for the rights of
corporations, further undermine the ability of governments in
the region to regulate their economies in the interests of their
226 Id. at 9. In such paper it is clarified "[T]hat trade liberalization under the WTO
should not involve any trade diversion, as MFN treatment implies
nondiscrimination between sources of imports." See Cooper, supra note 169, at 11.
227 Cooper, supra note 169, at 11.
228 Ghoneim, supra note 49, at 599.
229 Cooper, supra note 169, at 12-13.
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citizens and intensify the downward pressure on workers'
incomes through competition forjobs and investments. All of
this would take place in the absence of any counter-balancing
protections for workers, consumers or the environment." 23 0
F. As a Proclamation to the WTO Member States
Since trade diversion, or the shifting the importation of goods from an
outsider supplier to a less efficient internal one, is accomplished to
discriminate against the goods of the former in favor of those of the latter, it
acts as a tool that enables discriminatory treatment that is not normally
allowed by the GATT or even considered to be another exception231 to its
MFN principle.232 Consequently, imposing stringent RoO that are designed to
divert trade is discriminatory and is thus contrary to the latter principle.
Imposing stringent RoO in RTAs along with high external MFN tariffs
is a trade-isolating barricade that raises hell against outsider goods suppliers
and undermines the global efficiency. Hereby, applying any of following
solutions is suggested to prevent trade diversion from taking place within all
regional trade areas:
1) Forming a global free trade area.
2) Changing FTAs to CUs, harmonizing the applicable national trade
rules among the member countries of each CU, lowering the imposed
common external MFN tariffs and implementing tolerant RoO in each
CU (this could totally avoid both trade deflection and diversion).
3) If the importers of a RTA member state used and/or needs to import
cheap goods from an efficient outside supplier, the country of the
latter, by making a GATT rule, should be allowed to join the RTA.
4) Reducing the external tariffs to the levels of the preferential tariffs.
230 Id. at 14-15.
231 The word "another" is written because there is a formerly-indicated exception:
the liberalization of trade among only the constituent parties to RTAs pursuant to
the principles of Article XXIV of the GATT (1947).
232 Asian Development Bank, supra note 51, at 8. In such paper and page, trade
diversion is described as "a new form of discrimination" since the first form of
discrimination is subjecting the goods of the contracting parties to any FTA to a
duty-free access when they are traded between the parties under the FTA
preferences, which is legal and allowed under article XXIV of the GATT (1947).
While only the preferences granted under FTAs were regarded as a discriminatory
exception that is allowed under the GATT in current cited page, the author regards
all preferences granted under all RTAs as discriminatory exceptions allowed under
article XXIV of the GATT (1947).
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5) The imposition of flexible RoO in RTAs and lowering the imposed
external MFN tariffs of the RTAs member states.
Implementing any of the previously mentioned solutions could
eliminate trade diversion, but since the adoption of the latter solution is the
easiest, it concerns us more. Adopting it would encourage the RTAs member
countries to source goods from the most efficient suppliers located anywhere
in the world, would thus make them able to comply easily with the RTAs RoO
and would hence put them in a position to take advantage of the RTAs
preferences. Consequently, the RTAs members would witness welfare and the
global efficiency would be elaborated.
IV. THE HARMONIZATION OF NON-PREFERENTIAL AND
PREFERENTIAL RoO
RoO vary from country to country and from one RTA to another.
Their variation along with their complexity is considered to be a nightmare for
producers and traders all over the world. To determine the origin of a good,
one or more than one method could be applied. Moreover, the existence of
cumulation rules makes things worse, although they are considered by many to
facilitate trade. Even if they facilitate trade, one question arises: how many
rules the public and traders have to know in order to practice trade and know
their rights and obligations? For this reason, the harmonization of RoO
worldwide must be done properly in order to facilitate international trade and
to spread welfare all over the world.
Efforts to harmonize RoO were made in 1953 by the ICC. The latter
handed in a verdict to the GATT members suggesting that they agree upon a
regular "definition for determining the nationality of manufactured goods."23 3
Because some countries declared that the determination of origin should be
based on the "national economic policies" of each country while other
countries needed a global origin designation criterion along with regular
origin-specifying rules, the suggestions of the ICC were not embraced by the
GATT.234
On September 25, 1974, the Kyoto Convention came into force.
Annex D (which is Annex K currently) of the Convention was deemed to be
another trail to harmonize RoO.235  The Kyoto Convention aimed at
harmonizing both preferential and non-preferential RoO at which it was
233 LaNasa, supra note 1.
234 Id.
235 See Annex D. 1 (Rules of origin), Annex D.2 (Documentary evidence of Origin)
and Annex D.3 (Control of documentary evidence of origin) of the unrevised
version of Kyoto Convention. In the Current revised version of Kyoto Convention,
Annex D became K, Annex D. 1 became Chapter 1, Annex D.2 became Chapter 2
and Annex D.3 became Chapter 3.
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provided with a set of standards to be followed when determining the origin of
the imported goods, whether they are wholly obtained in one country or more
than one country is engaged their production. According to the Kyoto
Convention, when it comes to the latter case, the country of origin is defined
as the country where the last substantial transformation was performed.
Moreover, the Kyoto Convention lays out a set of principles that specify what
operation constitutes a substantial transformation.2 36 Unfortunately, many
GATT contracting parties did not certify Annex D of the Kyoto Convention.
As a result, RoO have been applied pursuant to the national interests of the
many countries and the Annex has been regarded as a model to be followed by
any of them.237 In the course of Uruguay Round, the WTO ARoO was
discussed. And here comes the role of the ARoO in harmonizing non-
preferential RoO.238
A. The Harmonization of Non-preferential RoO
1. The WTO ARoO2 39
"For the purposes . . . of this Agreement, rules of origin shall be
defined as those laws, regulations and administrative determinations of general
application applied by any Member to determine the country of origin of
goods provided such rules of origin are not related to contractual or
autonomous trade regimes leading to the granting of tariff preferences., 24 0
The Agreement strives to harmonize non-preferential RoO in a way
that can prevent such rules from becoming obstacles to trade. It was formed in
order for the WTO member states to comply with a regular pack of
harmonized rules when specifying the origin of a product on a MFN grounds.
Pursuant to the previously mentioned article, non-preferential RoO,
when harmonized, would not apply in preferential trade regimes.
The harmonization process of non-preferential RoO has been
undertaken by the WTO CRO in Geneva in association with the TCRO under
the aegis of the WCO in Brussels.2 4 1 The process was supposed to be
completed after three years from the commencement of the HWP, which
236 See RULES OF ORIGIN IN EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE, INT'L TRADE FORUM 3
(2001).
237 Inama, supra note 145, at 2.238 See RULES OF ORIGIN IN EXPORT CREDIT INSURANCE, supra note 236, at 3.
2 Full text of the Agreement is available at the World Trade Organization
Website. World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/22-roo.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2009).
240ARoO, supra note 2, Art. 1(1).
241 World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/theWTO e/minist-e/min96_e/rules.htm (last visited
Mar. 25, 2009).
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started on 20 July 1995 (i.e. by 20 July 1998).242 However, it has not been
completed yet due to the existence of a number of outstanding issues.2 43 Most
of the issues are based upon PSRoO.
Because a stage of transition is needed to harmonize the non-
preferential rules of origin, the ARoO is outfitted with a set of principles that
must be followed by the WTO member states before and after the completion
of the harmonization process.
Prior to the completion of the harmonization process (during the
transition period), the WTO member states shall comply with status quo and
are not allowed to make alterations to their RoO that suit their interests and
protect their national susceptible goods. Besides, their RoO must be imposed
transparently, without discrimination, without hindering international trade,
orderly and non-retroactively, if they are de novo.24 Unfortunately,
complying with the mentioned principles is not the intention of many WTO
member states, pursuant to what is clarified in the previous two parts of this
paper.
Subsequent to the completion of the harmonization process of non-
preferential RoO, all WTO member states will have to comply with a regular
single pack of harmonized RoO when specifying the origin of a product on a
MFN grounds. Furthermore, the origin of the product will be determined
according to the last substantial transformation norm24 5 , where the CTC test is
to be applied, if more than one country is involved in the production of the
good (i.e. if the product is not wholly-obtained).. Besides, the required change
should be done at the CTH level or the CTSH one, if the latter is necessary
(i.e. "the minimum change within the nomenclature"). Moreover, in case the
CTC does not confer origin for the roduct, the VA and/or the Specific
Processing test are to be implemented. 4
Once the harmonization process is completed, the harmonized non-
preferential RoO should be integrated in the agreement as an annex, and
consequently, the WTO member states would have to bring them into effect on
a MFN grounds from the enforcement date specified by the WTO Ministerial
Conference.247
242 Id. Art. 9(2)(a). See also World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres98_e/prl06 e.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2009).
243 See also World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/roie/roi-infoe.htm (last visited Mar. 25,
2009).
244 Agreement on Rules of Origin, supra note 2.
245 Id. Art. 3(b).
246 Id. Art.9(2).
247 Id. Art. 9(4).
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2. The Outstanding Issues Obstructing the Completion of the
Harmonization Process ofNon-preferential RoO
In June 1999, 486 suspended issues were submitted to the CRO.248
The CRO unraveled twenty-two issues by September 2000. In November
2001, eight more issues were unraveled. By March 2001, the number of
unraveled issues became fifty-four. In May 2001, forty-two issues were
resolved. In July 2001, sixty-seven issues were worked out. In October 2001,
115 issues were unraveled. By December 2001, fifty-three further issues were
resolved which makes the total number of unraveled issues until then 331, and
the total number of suspended issues was 155.249
Number of Number of Number of % of
Product groups issues referred resolved outstanding resolved
to the CRO issues issues issues
1-24 (Agricultural products) 125 63 62 50
25-27 (Mineral products) 10 8 2 80
28-40 (Chemicals) 38 27 9 71
41-43 (Leather 8 6 2 75
44-49 (Wood and paper) 11 11 0 100
50-63 (Textiles) 83 50 33 60
64-67 (Footwear) 14 9 5 64
68-70 (Ceramics) 12 9 3 75
71 (Precious stones and metals) 5 5 0 100
72-73 (Steel) 12 9 3 75
74-81 (Non-ferrous) 24 19 5 79
82-83 (Articles of metal) 17 17 0 100
84-90 (Machinery) 86 69 17 80
91 (Clocks and watches) 6 5 1 83
92-97 (Miscellaneous articles) 35 31 4 89
TOTAL 486 331 155 68
Source: WTO (2001).
Additional progress was achieved by June 2002, at which time the
total number of resolved issues became 348 out of the 486. Hence, the number
of suspended issues to that time became 138.250 By June 31, 2002, the CRO
referred ninety-four issues to the General Council. The time limit for resolving
the issues was extended to July 2004. In addition, the General Council
declared that the CRO would accomplish its harmonization task by December
31, 2004 once the issues were resolved. 2 5 1 The referred issues were one
wholly obtained, one "implication," and ninety-two product-specific. The
wholly obtained issue concerned the question of what origin to confer on the
fish picked up in the Exclusive Economic Zone and more specifically, whether
it should be based on the flag of the member attached to the fishing smack or
248 World Trade Organization, G/RO/41 (Sept. 3, 1999).
249 World Trade Organization, G/RO/49 (Dec. 17, 2001).
250 Committee Report, Report By the Chairman of Committee on Rules Of Origin to
the General Office, G/RO/52 (Jul. 15, 2002).
251 Id.; see also Vermulst, supra note 6, at 8.
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on the littoral member. The second issue concerned the impact the
harmonized RoO would have on other WTO agreements.
The General Council decided to concentrate on twelve of the ninety
four issues as follows: "Implications of the implementation of the Harmonized
Rules of Origin on other WTO Agreements; Dyeing and printing of textile
products; Coating of steel products; Assembly of machinery; Assembly of
vehicles; Refining of sugars; Roasting of coffee; Slaughtering of live animals;
Refining of oils; Fish taken from the sea of the exclusive economic zone;
Footwear; and Dairy products"252  Currently, about thirty products are
implicated in outstanding issues on PSRoO.2 53 The refusal of the WTO
contracting parties to settle these issues is reflected in their importance, since
such issues act upon the interests of the parties. This is why cooperation is
needed between the WTO member states to resolve the mentioned outstanding
issues.
3. Problems Concerning the Application ofRoO Worldwide
and Suggestions to Overcome the Odds
a. The CTC Method
The implementation of the CTC method is flexible and uncomplicated.
However, its application is relevant to the HS, seeing that a profound
acquaintance concerning the latter would be required once the non-preferential
RoO are harmonized. Moreover, the HS was not formed, on the whole, for
origin specification objectives. That is why the itemization of two kinds of
certain production processes are needed: processes that do not grant the
originating status, even though they engender a CTC, and processes that grant
the originating status, in spite of the fact that they do not result in a CTC.2 54
After harmonizing the non-preferential RoO, particularly in a case where the
CTC does not confer origin for the product, the VA and/or the Specific
Processing tests are to be applied. The issues concerning both of the latter tests
are discussed below.
b. The VC requirement:
There are three types of the VC requirements:
252 Vermulst, supra note 6, at 9. See also WALTER STOCKER, THE WCO SEMINAR
ON THE HARMONIZATION OF NON-PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN (2008),
available at
http://www.dga.gov.do/dgagov.net/uploads/file/seminario regionaloma/0 1rules-
of-origin-english.pdf (discussing details concerning similar issues and their
resolution).
253 Estevadeordal, supra note 47, at 13.
254 Vermulst, supra note 6, at 5.
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- The import VC requirement: if the percentage of the imported inputs
used in producing the product is not higher than the permitted utmost
one specified by the rule, origin is to be conferred to the product.
- The local VC requirement: origin is to be conferred to the product if
the percentage of the domestic value that has been appended in the
country claiming origin is not lower than the required least one
specified by the rule.
- The value of originating parts requirement: origin is to be conferred to
the product if the percentage of the originating parts used in its
production out of the aggregate is not lower than the least one
specified by the rule.255
Although the VC test is transparent and uncomplicated when identified,
there are defects in its application.
i. The Denominator and the Numerator: An
Emphasis on the EC's Practice
To calculate the percentage of the local content, the numerator should
be divided by the denominator and then multiplied by 100. To calculate the
percentage of the import content, the value of the non-originating materials-
at the specified delivery term-should be divided by the denominator and then
multiplied by 100. The numerator is the sum of the factors that are counted as
parts of the local content. The denominator is the delivery term the finished
good is to be valued at.
Pursuant to the Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of
Kyoto Convention, the finished goods should be valued at the ex-works or the
FOB price2 56 (the denominator). Moreover, the imported inputs should be
valued on a CIF basis.25 7  The EC uses the ex-works price25 8 as the
255 Id. at 6.
256 The FOB price in the Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of
Kyoto Convention is referred to as "the price at exportation."
257 The CIF price in the Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of
Kyoto Convention is referred to as "the dutiable value at importation."
258 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 1, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990), available at
http://aei.pitt.edu/4220/01/001701_1.pdf. According to Article 3(2) (c) of Protocol
1 of Lom6 IV, the ex-works price "shall mean the price paid for the product
obtained to the manufacturer in whose undertaking the last working or processing
is carried out, provided the price includes the value of all the materials used in
manufacture, minus any internal taxes which are, or may be repaid when the
product obtained is exported"); see also Commission Regulation (EEC) No.
2454/93, art. 40 (1993) (laying down provisions for the implementation of Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code 1993
O.J. (L 253), 11.10, available at
http://www.furs.sillaw/EU/zvr/zakonodajaCIRCA/EU-circa/carina/31993R2454.p
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denominator. The ex-works price is the cost of the good from the
manufacturing firm. This price includes all costs incurred in producing the
good up to placing it in the manufacturing firm - i.e. it includes the costs of all
inputS25 9 (the cost of the originating inputs + the value of the non-originating
inputs at the specified delivery term),2 60 direct labor costs, 261 factory costs,
SG&A expenses, 2 62 packing expenditures and profit (if available). 26 3
All of the mentioned elements, with the exception of the value of the
non-originating inputs, are factors counted as part of the local content. Their
sum gives the numerator if the ex-works price is used as the denominator.
That is why determining what factor is to be counted as part of the local
content, and consequently calculating the numerator depends on the
df ("'ex-works price' means the ex-works price of the product obtained minus any
internal taxes which are, or may be, repaid when such product is exported").
259 Both kinds of inputs (the originating and the non-originating) are known as
direct materials.
260 For example, if the imported inputs are valued at the FOB price, all costs
incurred in producing the inputs up to delivering them on board the shipping vessel,
at the agreed specified export port (pursuant to the terms of the sale contract), will
be regarded as non-originating and all charges incurred for transportation and
insurance will be regarded as originating. Hence, only such originating charges will
be included in the denominator and will be thus regarded as part of the local
content.
261 The manufacturing costs (or product costs) consist of direct and indirect
manufacturing costs. While the direct manufacturing costs comprise the direct
materials and direct labor costs, the indirect costs comprise the factory costs (or
manufacturing overheads). The factory costs include the indirect labor, indirect
materials and factory-related costs.
262See Ben McClure, Introduction to Fundamental Analysis,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/fundamentalanalysis/ (The SG&A
expenses, ipso facto, include the wages for administrators, royalties (only if they
are rational under the EC's standards), insurance, traveling expenditures for the
administrators and those who are assigned to sell the goods, expenses for heat and
lighting, costs of leasing facilities, and payroll outlays. However, when it comes to
using the ex-works price as the denominator, any SG&A expenses incurred
subsequent to the departure of the product from the manufacturing firm must be
taken away. Thus, direct selling expenses will be disregarded).
263 Edwin Vermulst, Rules of Origin as Commercial Policy Instruments? Revisited,
in RULES OF ORIGIN IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 442, 433-
85 (E. Vermulst, P. Waer & J. Bourgeois eds., 1992), available at http://www.vwv-
law.be/publications/ORIGINCHAPTER9.pdf. See also, in such book, a
comparative analysis on the usage of different denominators and the numerator
calculations by different jurisdictions: the U.S., the EC, Japan, Australia and
Canada. It is to be noted that under the EC's standards, if the profit is not rational,
it will not be included in the denominator or the ex-works price.
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denominator used.264 It is clear, then, from the previous explanation that the
denominator is the addition of numerator to the value of the non-originating
materials.
The EC uses the CIF price to value the imported inputs2 65 , at which
any payable charges "incurred from" transiting the inputs from the
manufacturing firm till reaching the boundary of the importing country are to
be regarded as non-originating and at which the payable charges incurred after
crossing the boundary of the importing country are to be regarded as
originating.266
Since the EC uses the ex-works price as the denominator and values the
imported inputs at the CIF price, it complies with the Recommended Practice 5
of Chapter 1 of Annex K of Kyoto Convention.
Although valuing the finished goods at the FOB price complies with
the Recommended Practice 5 of Chapter 1 of Annex K of Kyoto Convention
and results in the containment of the numerator to more local content
factors,2 67 the ex-works price has been agreed to be more adequate than the
FOB price when used as the denominator.268 In addition, using the latter as the
denominator is deemed to be unfair to the factories that are situated far away
from the seaport because the more distance that exists between the factory and
the seaport, the more transportation costs from the factory to the seaport will
have to be paid. Thus, using the FOB as the denominator will provide the
factories situated near the seaport with a specialty (less transportation costs)
that the factories situated far away from the seaport will not have. Hereby,
using the ex-works price instead of the FOB price as the denominator is
deemed to be more fair than vice versa, albeit the fact that using any of them
264 However, that is not always the case because although the U.S.in its preferential
trade regimes uses the FOB price as the denominator which comprises the SG&A
expenses and profit, it does not count the latter elements as local content factors
(only royalties are included in the numerator because sometimes they are
comprised in the factory costs and not the SG&A expenses). See id. at 441.
265 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 (Jul. 2, 1993). Pursuant to Article
40, "origin is conferred if the value of the non-originating materials used does not
exceed a given percentage of the ex-works price of the products obtained, such
percentage shall be calculated as follows: 'value' means the customs value at the
time of import of the non-originating materials used or, if this is not known and
cannot be ascertained, the first ascertainable price paid for such materials in the
country of processing," available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG: 1993R2454:20010701:E
N:PDF.266 See Vermulst, supra note 263, at 438.
267 When compared with using the ex-works price as the denominator.268 See, e.g., Secretariat Note, Customs Cooperation Council-Rules of Origin of
Goods, 29.215E T7-3231, at 20 (Nov. 2, 1982); see also Vermulst, supra note 263,
at 442.
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as the denominator complies with the logical recommendations of Kyoto
Convention.
Since the denominator and the numerator used to calculate the VC
percentage may differ from one country to another,269 using the EC's standards
of calculating the VC percentage as model to be followed by all WTO member
states seems to be the most reasonable solution because, as previously
mentioned, the EC complies with the rational recommendations of Kyoto
Convention when it comes to calculating the VC percentage, i.e. to use the ex-
works price as the denominator, to value the imported inputs at the CIF
price2 70 and to use the same EC's local content factors for calculating the
numerator.2 7'
ii. Chastising Efficient Production Processes:
The VC requirement chastises "low cost or efficient production
operations"272 in countries with cheap labor and inputs because such cheapness
makes it difficult for the producers to include costly local content factors in the
numerator to comply easily with the VC requirement, contrary to the producers
in countries with expensive labor and inputs. Consequently, lesser-developed
countries, by reason of the VC requirement, are discriminated against and do
not benefit from the advantage of low-cost production operations that they
273
only have over developed countries.27 Despite that, after the harmonization of
non-preferential RoO, the efficient producers in the lesser-developed countries
would not deal with the aforementioned problem in most cases because the VC
269 For instance, the denominator used in the U.S. preferential trade schemes is the
transaction value. The transaction value is "the value of the good adjusted to a
F.O.B. basis." See, e.g., Agreement on the application by Mexico of a North
American Free Trade Agreement Safeguard Measure on Certain Poultry, July 24,
2003, 2003 WL 22324890.
270 While the EC, Japan, Australia and Canada use the CIF price to value the
imported inputs, the U.S. uses the FOB one. See Vermulst, supra note 263, at 438.
271 Id. at 438, 478. It could have been sufficient to urge for using the EC's
denominator and the valuation criterion of imported inputs (the CIF price) since
this would consequently specify what factor is to be counted as part of the local
content. However, that is not always the case because although the U.S., for
example, in its preferential trade regimes uses the FOB price as the denominator
which comprises the SG&A expenses and profit, it does not count the latter
elements as local content factors (only royalties are counted because sometimes
they are comprised in the factory costs and not the SG&A expenses). This is why
all WTO member states should use the same EC's local content factors to calculate
the numerator since this, as illustrated, is the most reasonable solution. See id. at
441-42, 444-45, 478.
272 Id. at 447.
273 See Brenton, supra note 128, at 22.
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requirement is going to be used as a supplementary, and not primary, origin
designation criterion.
iii. The Instability of the Inputs Prices
Worldwide and the Changeableness of
Exchange Rates
Due to the instability of the inputs prices and "exchange rates,"
calculating the percentage of the VC is inconstant.274 However, if the
percentage of the VC test to be complied with is going to be tolerant after the
harmonization of non-preferential RoO, 275 the producers globally would have
the ability to import inputs of varying qualities and at different prices from
anywhere, and would regard consequently the vicissitude of the inputs prices
worldwide as a blessing.. Moreover, the producers in countries with
insufficient or limited domestic sources of supply would not have to worry
about increasing the percentage of the local content.
An example of a tolerant VC requirement is indicated in the Canada -
Chile FTA in which a RVC of thirty five percent is required to be complied
with under the transaction value method.2
Pursuant to Brenton, "[a]n operation which confers origin today may not do so
tomorrow if exchange rates change.",2 77 Actually, the problem of unstable
exchange rates might not be solved, unless a global economic and monetary
union is going to be formed. However, Brenton used the word "may" which
clarifies that the vice versa of what he said may happen, i.e. an operation
which does not confer origin today may confer it tomorrow, if exchange rates
change positively.
iv. The Import VC requirement vs. the Local
VC One
The WCO should take a decision on whether the applicable VC
requirement is going to be the import VC requirement or the local VC one.278
274 See LaNasa, supra note 1. See also Teruo Ujie, Trade Facilitation, Manila,
Asian Development Bank 11 (Asian Dev. Bank, Econ. & Research Dep't, Working
Paper Series No. 78, 2006).
2 That would be the case when it comes only to using the VC requirement as a
supplementary origin determination method.
27 See Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Chile, July 4, 1997, available at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-
acc/chile-chili/anxd l/sect2-chap84-2.aspx?lang='en.
277See Brenton, supra note 128, at 22.
See Vermulst, supra note 263, at 478.
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Generally, the import VC requirement is applied by many jurisdictions.27 9 For
example, it is applied in the EU preferential trade regimes. Moreover, applying
it is uncomplicated.280 Its application would lessen the administrative
obstacles281 and would not need circumstantial instantaneous inspections on
the "data provided."282
v. The Consistent Harmonization of the Non-
preferential RoO that Depend on the VC
Requirement
Based on the arguments in the previous subparts, the WCO has to bear
in mind that the EC's denominator (ex-works price), local content factors and
valuation method of imported inputs (CIF price) used in calculating the VC
percentages can lay an optimal groundwork for the harmonization of non-
preferential RoO that depend on the VC requirement. In addition, the import
VC requirement of a tolerant percentage to be complied with should be the
supplemental origin designation method.
c. The Specific Manufacturing Operation Method
Like the VC test, the specific manufacturing operation method is
transparent and not obscure when identified. It is also concrete; however, it has
its share of defects. The specific manufacturing process method engenders
always product-specific RoO 283 and is misused pursuant to national "interests."
284 Though, by solving the product-specific outstanding issues and by
completion of the harmonization process of non-preferential RoO, the specific
manufacturing operation method would not engender anymore product-
specific origin rules and would not be misused pursuant to national interests.
279See Rajan Ratna, Rules of Origin: Diverse Treatment and Future Development in
the Asia and Pacic Region, in ECON. & SOCIAL COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC 76,
67-91 (2008). See also Brenton, supra note 128, at 21.
280 Applying it is uncomplicated because the import VC percentage can be simply
calculated by adding only the costs of the imported inputs valued at the specified
delivery term together, dividing such costs by the denominator and multiplying the
remainder by 100, contrary to calculating the percentage of the local VC where the
costs of a variety of local content factors must be added together before being
divided by the denominator and then multiplied then by 100.
281 Administrative obstacles take place particularly when it comes to using the
value of originating parts requirement. In spite of this, such obstacles will be
lessened if the import VC requirement is going to be supplementary origin
determination criterion after the harmonization of non-preferential RoO.
282 See Vermulst, supra note 263, at 448-49, 479.
283 See Brenton, supra note 128, at 17.
284 See Vermulst, supra note 263, at 450.
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Another problem with the specific manufacturing operation test
determining when the rule of origin requires the measurement of complicated
production operations. The rule then becomes stringent and compliance with it
becomes difficult.2 85 That is why the WCO should keep in mind that the rule
should require the simplest possible operations to be taken for producing the
good when it comes to using the specific manufacturing operation test as a
supplementary origin designation method.
An example for a tolerant specific manufacturing operation rule is that
indicated in DR-CAFTA, where the reasonable single transformation process
is required to be complied with for certain apparel products which are:
"brassieres (HTS subheading 6212.10), certain woven boxer shorts and
pajamas (found in HTS headings 6207 through 6208), and certain woven
women's/girls' dresses (found in HTS subheadings 6204.42 through
6204.44).",286
4. The Road So Far and a Bright Road Ahead
If all of the suggestions, arguments and analysis mentioned so far in
this part are to be taken into consideration by the WCO when harmonizing the
non-preferential RoO and cooperation between the WTO member states is
used to resolve the outstanding issues, the non-preferential RoO will be
harmonized and integrated in the agreement as an annex, and the contracting
parties will consequently have to carry them out from the enforcement date
specified by the ministerial conference. Thereupon, the origin of the product
will be determined according to a clear substantial transformation norm where
the CTC (either CTH or CTSH) method will be applied when more than one
country is involved in the production of the good and reinforced, if needed, by
the VC and/or the specific manufacturing operation tests.
Pursuant to the WTO negotiating text of 2008, the morphology of the
non-preferential RoO once harmonized will consist of definitions, general
rules,287 an Appendix on wholly obtained goods, and Appendix on PSRoO.2 88
285 See Brenton, supra note 128, at 17 (explaining the advantages, disadvantages,
and key issues of the three methods of determining origin).
286 See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Probable Economic Effect of Modifications to
DR-CAFTA Rules of Origin and Tartffs for Certain Apparel Goods, Investigation
No. DR-CAFTA-103-16, USITC Publication 3946, Report No. USITC/PUB-3946,
(Sept. 2007), at 2-6.; see also Eric 0. Autor, Presentation at Guatemala Apparel
and Textile Exporters Commission (VESTEX) Apparel Sourcing Show 2, Apr. 19,
2007, www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Documents&op=viewlive&spid=313.
287 There are six rules; they are: 1) Harmonized System, 2) Determination of
Origin, 3) Neutral Elements, 4) Packing and Packaging Materials and Containers,
5) Accessories and Spare Parts and Tools, and 6) Minimal Operations and
Processes.
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Currently, the reference of the negotiating text of the WTO is
G/RO/W/111/Rev.3. Although there has been unofficial progress, the
harmonization of non-preferential RoO is not over.289
Having a single regular set of non-preferential RoO would ensure the
WTO member states' compliance with status quo without giving them the
chance to make alterations to any origin rule that suits their interests and
protects their national susceptible goods, and would consequently cease the
occurrence of any dispute that could be aroused, like the U.S - India one. In
addition, customs administrations worldwide would not face any more
dilemmas caused by a variety of origin rules imposed differently by each
WTO member state. Further, non-preferential RoO would not be considered a
nightmare for producers and traders all over the world.
B. Harmonizing Preferential RoO
During the Uruguay Round, the harmonization of preferential RoO
was proposed. In return, the ARoO in Annex II (Common Declaration with
Regard to Preferential Rules of Origin) has been covering principles that the
WTO member states must comply with when imposing RoO in whether
autonomous or contractual trade regimes.290 Such principles are much closer
to those clarified by the agreement under its article 2. The exception of
preferential RoO from the harmonization process undertaken by the WCO and
specified in the ARoO reflects the will of the WTO member states to use them
according to their interests. In 1995, a group of intergovernmental experts met
in order to discuss the issues of harmonizing the preferential RoO of the GSP
to make it easier for developing countries to take advantage of the GSP
accorded preferences. 2 9 1 That is why many have supported the harmonization
of preferential RoO and many see that it is of crucial importance.
Preferential RoO are divided with great elaboration in RTAs. They
could be itemized in 200 pages. For instance, the PSRoO of NAFTA is
specified in about 200 pages. Moreover, the application of preferential RoO
differs from an agreement to another, making things complicated for a trader
when her country appears to be a member in a variety of agreements that
impose different RoO. Even enterprises face difficulties when complying
with a diversity of costs provoked by different agreements that lead to what is
named as the "Spaghetti Bowl" phenomenon. Furthermore, the CTC method
288 World Trade Organization, Negotiating Texts for the Harmonization Work
Programme, G/RO/451W/11 I/Rev.1 (Feb. 25, 2008).
289 E-mail from Pierre de Vaucher to Hatem Mabrouk, Ph.D. Student, School of
Law at the University of Dundee (Jan. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
290 Vermulst, supra note 6, at 8.
291 See Inama, supra note 145, at 16 (citing UNCTAD); see also Agreed
Conclusions of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Rules of Origin,
TD/B/COM.2/13 (1995).
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applied in many preferential trade regimes sometimes requires the change to
be done at the tariff item level, which does not conform with the CTC test
included in the harmonization efforts of non-preferential RoO, where the
minimum change in the tariff classification or the CTSH is to apply in case the
CTH is enough to confer origin.
1. Negotiations are Taking Place and Must Be Taken into
Account, if Efforts to Harmonize Preferential RoO are
Going to Come into Existence
The ASEAN has negotiated and is negotiating FTAs with China,
Japan, India, Republic of Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Such FTAs
include, or will include for the ones that are still in negotiations, the 10
ASEAN member states 29 2 and the contracting FTA party, which makes the
total eleven.293 That is why the ASEAN FTAs are one of the biggest FTAs in
the world.
There were also proposals to form the ASEAN+6 FTA that will
include the following ten ASEAN member states + China, Japan, the ROK,
India, Australia and New Zealand.2 94 Therefore, if the ASEAN is going to
form a single FTA with a single set of harmonized preferential RoO with all of
the mentioned countries, then this must be taken into account when efforts to
harmonize preferential RoO come into existence.
The APTA (which was known as the Bangkok Agreement) is also one
of the largest RTAs, consisting of six contracting parties: Bangladesh, India,
Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka.
Efforts were made to include more contracting parties from Central Asia. The
secretariat of the United Nations Economic and Social succeeded in
harmonizing the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement RoO. Such rules are
uncomplicated, plain, all-inclusive and reasonable. For instance, a forty five
292 Namely, the Government of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao
PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Homepage,
http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (last visited July 1, 2009).
293 For more information, see the agreements and the Framework Agreements on
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and the mentioned countries. Association of Southeast Asian
Nations, AFTA & FTAs, http://www.aseansec.org/4920.htm (last visited July 2,
2009).
294 See Ratna, supra note 279, at 98. See also East Asia Summit: In the Shadow of
Sharp Divisions, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Dec. 7, 2005,
http://english.people.com.cn/200512/07/eng20051207 226350.html. See also
National News Bureau of Thailand, ASEAN+6, Mar. 21, 2009,
http://thainews.prd.go.th/newsenglish/14th aseansummite/index.php?option-com
content&task-view&id=86&Itemid=6.
Rules of Origin as International Trade Hindrances
percent local VC is imposed.295 Since harmonizing RoO in such a simple way
was accomplished in the APTA, there is a big possibility to achieve someday a
successful harmonized set of preferential RoO.
The APEC consists of 21 member states.296 Many agreements are
formed between its members. One of the attempts to form a single RTA
between the members was conducted by the former U.S. President Bush, to
form a so-called APEC-wide FTA.297 In addition, the heads of the APEC
ratified the report on Strengthening Regional Economic Integration in 2007. In
the report, the heads declared that by carrying some dissecting steps the
formation of the FTAAP can be practicably achieved and that the RoO
imposed in the variety of RTAs formed between the APEC members are
recommended to be checked up with a plan aiming at making them reasonably
imposed.298
The 2009 APEC arrangements instruct its members to:
295 Ratna, supra note 279, at 87.
296 Namely, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's Republic of
China, Hong Kong - China, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, the Philippines, Russia,
Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. APEC:
Member Economies, http://www.apec.org/apec/membereconomies.html (last
visited July 15, 2009).
297 See Connie Levett, Bush Pushes on APEC Free Trade Agreement, THE AGE,
Nov. 15, 2006, at 8, http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/bush-pushes-on-
apec-free-trade-agreement/2006/11/14/1163266550761.html.
APEC ECONOMIC LEADERS, THE REPORT ON STRENGTHENING REGIONAL
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: A REPORT ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION,
INCLUDING A POSSIBLE FREE TRADE AREA OF ASIA-PACIFIC AS A LONG-TERM
PROSPECT (2007), available at
http://www.apec.org/etc/medialib/apec-media_1ibrary/downloads/committees/cti/p
ubs/2007.Par.0025.File.vl.1.
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* Examine the various types of preferential rules of origin used in the
APEC region with the aim of increasing knowledge of their
similarities and differences.
* Explore, in close cooperation with the business sector, how rules of
origin used in economies' RTAs/FTAs might be rationalized.
* Expand dialogue on examining ways to achieve greater consistency
in key provisions of RTAs/FTAs in the region.
* Expand and deepen the convergences/divergences study by adding to
the agreements and chaptered covered in 2008.
* Examining the feasibility of enlarging, docking or merging existing
FTAs.
* Conduct analytical work on the economic impact of a FTAAP and
on the specific benefits and challenges for APEC economies
associated with such an agreement.
Friends of the Chair (FOTC) groups on REI* set up at both the CTI** and
Senior Officials levels will continue to oversee the work on the REI agenda.
The CTI-FOTC will liaise with the relevant sub-fora to help them prioritize
their REI-related work.. The CTI-FOTC has agreed to focus its initial work in
3 areas: rules of origin, convergences and divergences of FTAs, and docking,
merging and enlargement of FTAs.
Capacity building workshops, policy dialogues, or symposia will continue to
be conducted at the CTI/CTI sub-forum level, allowing exchanges between
government officials and FTA negotiators on best practice and strengthening
FTAs in the region.
Source:
http://www.apec.org/apec/apec groups/other apecgroups/FTARTA.html
* Stands for Regional Economic Integration.
** Stands for Committee on Trade and Investment.
Forming a single RTA between the APEC member states with a
reasonably imposed uniform set of harmonized RoO reflects the possibility to
harmonize preferential RoO in a wise manner, and will reduce the effect of the
Spaghetti Bowl incident.
The following figure shows the bulk of the Spaghetti Bowl
Phenomenon within the APEC region. In fact, such phenomenon should be
named "the Plague" instead because deeper look at the figure shows RTAs
spreading like the Plague virus. One should also realize that Russia and
Chinese Taipei are the only cleanest circles in the figure, having not yet been
infected since they have not negotiated any RTA with any of the APEC
member states. The Plague, or Spaghetti Bowl, is deemed to be a nightmare
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for traders. More importantly, it acts like a virus and epidemic that infects
international trade with hindrance. The circles in the next figure represent the
APEC members, with the lines representing an existing RTA between the
circles/members they connect with each other.
Source: Author's analysis based on
http://www.apec.org/webapps/fta-rta-information.html#others_fta
If the FTAAP is going to be formed, which could to a great degree take
place pursuant to the clarified information, a single set of harmonized RoO
between the APEC members would be imposed, taking into consideration the
mentioned efforts to impose them in a reasonable manner. That is why
harmonizing the RoO between the APEC countries should be taken into
consideration, in case any attempt to harmonize preferential RoO are coming
into existence.
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- The current EU attempts to harmonize its preferential RoO should
also be taken into account.
"Breakdown of use of ROO criteria in EU preferential trade
agreements"
Source: EC (2005b)
Method: WO CTH SP VA WO+CTH WO+VA
Number of rules 29 98 150 128 4 4
% of total 5,3% 18% 27,5% 23,5% 0,7% 0,7%
Method: CTH+VA SP+VA WO+CTH+VA Sets+VA NR TOTAL
Number of rules 94 28 2 2 6 545
% of total 17,2% 5,1% 0,4% 0,4% 1,1% 100%
Key: WO=wholly obtained CTH=change in tariff heading SP-specific processing
NR--no rule (manufacture from any heading)
Source: Naumann (2005).
Up until 2005, the EU was engaged in approximately 40 RTAs. 299 It
applied different single lists of PSRoO in the mentioned agreements.
Pursuant to the previous figure, the number of PSRoO in the single
lists applied by the EU was 545. Moreover, the EU applies a mixture of the
three main methods in determining origin. 00
The EC in one of its Green Papers reflects the EU efforts to harmonize
its preferential RoO, in which the VA test is implemented as the main criterion
for determining origin .o
If the EU continues applying its same numerator calculations and
denominator with the imposition of a reasonable percentage of the import VC
requirement, it will not find problems applying the VC test as the main
criterion in determining the origin of the product. But why applying it as the
main criterion without following the one defined by the WTO efforts of
harmonizing non-preferential RoO (i.e., the CTC)? "Whichever approach is
preferred, CTH or value-added, it could be preferred for both preferential and
299 European Commission, Customs: Strategy for Simplified Rules of Origin -
Frequently Asked Questions 1 (MEMO/05/95),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/95&format-
HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en.
3 European Commission, Justification of the Choice ofa Value Added Method for
the Determination of the Origin ofProcessed Products 3 (Working Paper:
TAXUD/1 121/05, Apr. 20, 2005).
30 The Rules of Origin in Preferential Trade Arrangements - Orientations for the
Future, at 4-5, 9-10, COM (2005) 100 final (Mar. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.eudelbangladesh.org/en/whatsnew/EN%20100%20-%20original.pdf.
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non-preferential RoOs."30 2 The EU declared that its preferential RoO cannot
be based on the same WTO efforts of harmonizing non-preferential RoO
because they are connected with the EU's "external policies and negotiations."
However, part one and two of this paper reflect the will of the EU to breach
some WTO principles by the application of protectionist, trade-diverting RoO
in some of its preferential trade regimes. A curious observer may wonder
whether this has anything to do with external EU policies and negotiations.
"The aim of science is always to reduce complexity to simplicity."303
Thus, applying the same criterion when determining origin, for preferential
and non-preferential purposes, would facilitate trade for traders. Otherwise,
they will be lost due to the application of different RoO. For this reason, the
EU efforts to harmonize preferential RoO, while being given respect and
deference, should be done pursuant to the non-preferential RoO harmonization
efforts promoted by the WTO.
2. Harmonizing Preferential RoO? How?
Harmonized non-preferential RoO would lead toward harmonized
preferential RoO because they would supply the preferential RoO with a fine
pattern to be based on and consequently harmonized. That is why harmonizing
preferential RoO, if attempted, should be based on the substantial
transformation norm in which undergoing the minimum CTC, if not
supplemented by the VC and/or the specific manufacturing operation tests,
should grant origin for the non-wholly obtained good. Besides, when it comes
to the application of the VC test as a supplementary criterion of origin
designation, the import VC requirement of a tolerant percentage should be
applied and the calculation of such percentage should be achieved by
following the same EC's standards used in calculating it.30
It is to be noted that RTAs all over the world have certain things in
common concerning their RoO. Consequently, harmonizing such
commonalities would be an easy task to accomplish. On the other hand, there
are differences that exist between RTAs RoO, therefore requiring cooperation
between the WTO member states in order to harmonize them.
302 John Barcel6 III, Harmonizing Preferential Rules of Origin in the WTO System
30 (Comell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 72, Dec. 2006).
303 William James, The Stream of Thought, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, ch.
IX (1890), available at http://psychclassics.asu.edulJames/Principles/prin9.htm.
3 William E. James, Rules of Origin in Emerging Asia-Pacific Preferential Trade
Agreements: Will PTAs Promote Trade and Development?, in ESCAP, TRADE
FACILITATION BEYOND THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: REGIONAL
PRACTICES, CUSTOMS VALUATION AND OTHER EMERGING ISSUES, A STUDY BY THE
ASIA PACIFIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING NETWORK ON TRADE 137-162 (2007),
available at http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/tipub2466.pdf.
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a. Commonalities
Most RTA's RoO have certain factors in common. Consequently, any
efforts to harmonize preferential RoO would not find a problem harmonizing
those factors. The common factors are:
(a) General definitions;
(b) List of wholly obtained or produced goods;
(c) Insufficient or minimal operations or processes that do not
confer origin;
(d) Neutral elements;
(e) Consignment criteria;
(f) Certificate of origin;
(g) Denial of preferential tariff treatment;
(h) Claim for preferential tariff treatment;
(i) Administrative arrangements relating to issuance and
verification of certificate of origin.305
b. Diferences
The factors RTAs RoO do not, in most cases, have in common are: (1)
the basic required origin method to be applied under the last substantial
transformation norm; (2) the calculation of the numerator and using the
denominator; (3) PSRoO; and (4) cumulation rules. Points (1) and (2) can be
easily solved, if all of the arguments indicated in this part so far are taken into
account. Accordingly, origin would be determined pursuant to the substantial
transformation norm at which undergoing the minimum CTC would confer
origin, for the non-wholly obtained product, and could be supplemented, when
needed, by the application of the VC and/or the specific manufacturing
operation tests. Besides, when it comes to the application of the VC test, the
import VC requirement of a tolerant percentage would be applied and
calculating such percentage would be achieved by following the same EC's
standards used in calculating it.
i. PSRoO
Because many outstanding issues surrounding PSRoO are obstructing
the WCO from completing the harmonization process of non-preferential RoO;
PSRoO should not be included when harmonizing preferential RoO.
305 Ratna, supra note 279, at 87.
Rules of Origin as International Trade Hindrances
Otherwise, such harmonization would take many years to be accomplished,
which similarly occurred with the harmonization process of non-preferential
RoO. For this reason, I declare that I completely agree with Ratna when he
said:
On the services, one can learn from the WTO Harmonization
Work Programme. In the context of RTAs, it would be
desirable to keep the rules of origin simple and transparent,
and preferably without any product-specific rules. Thus, it
would be preferable to follow a single set of general rules as
qualifying criteria for the not-wholly obtained or produced
goods.306
It is better and easier to comply with a general rule that clarifies the
main criterion to determine the origin of the product under the last substantial
norm rather than complying with a list of PSRoO that contains multiple rules
applied to a variety of products. With the non-containment of PSRoO in
RTAs, RoO would be unambiguous, uncomplicated, flexible, and clear for the
public, traders, and producers.
ii. Cumulation Rules: The Baits:
It is known that the application of stringent RoO encourages regional
trade area finished goods producers to source intermediate goods from inside
of the RTA. However, with cumulation rules, finished goods producers would
be induced more to source from inside of the RTA leading to a case of trade
diversion if the regional trade area intermediate goods are less efficient than
those of outside suppliers.
Imagine the case where stringent RoO are imposed in a RTA with a
bilateral cumulation rule that preserves the origin of a finished product when
produced using intermediate inputs sourced from a certain partner country in
the regional trade area, taking into consideration that the inputs of the partner
country are less efficient than an outside source of supply. Consequently,
sourcing intermediate goods from the inefficient suppliers will take place
within the regional trade area to take advantage of the cumulation rule and thus
comply with the stringent RTA RoO leading to a case of trade diversion.
Hence, cumulation rules were used in the previous mentioned example as bait
that aims at diverting trade to the inefficient supplier of the regional trade area.
As a result, cumulation rules act in many cases as protectionist, trade-diverting
tools since they could protect inefficient suppliers inside of a regional trade
area by diverting trade to them.
306 Id. at 88.
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Barcel6 promoted similar arguments regarding cumulation rules as
trade hindrances.307 He stated that their role becomes more active the more
stringent RoO are in a RTA..30s Furthermore, Barcel6 mentions that
cumulation rules violate the principles of article XXIV (4) of the GATT since
they act as obstacles to the trade of outside suppliers with the regional trade
area.309 It is worth mentioning that the arguments stated at the beginning of
part two of this note are similar to Barcel6's arguments because, if the
imposition of trade-diverting RoO violates the principles of article XXIV (4)
of the GATT, then the imposition of cumulation rules also violates those
principles since such rules are trade-diverting in most cases, i.e. diverting trade
to inefficient suppliers of a regional trade area.310
Inefficient intermediate goods producers usually lobby for the
application of cumulation rules in RTAs to serve as bait for internal finished
goods producers. Once the latter fall into that trap of costly sourcing from
within the regional trade area to take advantage of the cumulation rules, trade
diversion takes place from efficient outside suppliers to inefficient internal
ones.
C. Suggestions Should Be Taken Into Consideration When
Harmonizing Preferential RoO and Until Harmonizing the Non-
preferential Ones
By following all of the previously mentioned arguments of this part,
efforts to harmonize preferential and non-preferential RoO would result in
success to a considerable extent. However, there are other points should be
taken into account concerning the harmonization of both preferential and non-
preferential RoO.
Tolerance rules are contrary to cumulation ones because they allow
sourcing a fixed magnitude of inputs from anywhere in the world without
affecting the origin of the final product leading to no trade diversion.3 1' That
is why increasing the scope of applying tolerance rules would facilitate trade
and needs thus to be taken into account when harmonizing preferential RoO.
In addition, duty drawback and deferral rules facilitate trade for traders, but
must be appropriately applied. For instance, David Gantz declared that it is
"evident that the lack of duty drawback treatment could be a powerful
incentive for [Mexico] to seek alternative sources of parts in the future from
North American rather than third country sources... This could result in a
signficant diversion oftrade from third countries (e.g., Korea, Taiwan, Japan,
307 Barcel6, supra note 303, at 19-20.
308 Id. at 19.
3 Id. at 26 (referencing GATT).
3o Id. at 25-26.
3" Id. at 34.
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and India) to regional suppliers."3 12  As a first step, the issue of
harmonizing preferential RoO should be discussed at the World Economic
Forum in Davos at the coming annual meeting. 3 By exchanging ideas there
and by considering all of the previous steps on how to harmonize preferential
RoO and how to complete the harmonization process of non-preferential ones,
achieving a new record in the history of trade could come into existence.
Moreover, the interests of developing countries should be taken into
consideration when harmonizing either non-preferential or preferential RoO.
Besides, developing countries should know that countries with big markets
like the U.S. and the EU usually request their industries to present proposals
concerning the harmonization process of non-preferential RoO, which might
lead to some protectionist implementations. Consequently, this could happen
when harmonizing preferential RoO. That is why developing countries should
be aware of the mentioned because there will be no turning back once both of
the latter types of rules are harmonized.3 14
V. CONCLUSION
Although RoO are of great importance to international trade, they
could act as international trade hindrances when used as protectionist
apparatuses, when used to divert trade and when their variation becomes a
nightmare for traders and producers.
By solving the outstanding issues and by applying the same criteria
adopted by the WTO in its harmonization efforts of non-preferential RoO to
harmonize preferential RoO without including any PSRoO or cumulation
rules, RoO would be used for the uses they are designed for and without
distorting trade, taking into account that trade currently is needed to be
facilitated to overcome the current global economic crisis. An important issue
312 William A. Hagedom, FTAA-Committee of Government Representatives on the
Participation of Civil Society, Cover Sheet for Open Invitation Contributions,
NAFTA's Implications for the Free Trade Area of the Americas in regard to Trade,
Labor and Duty Drawback (June 10, 2002), available at http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/spcomm/soc/Contributions/Quito/cscv39 e.asp.
313 See World Economic Forum, http://www.weforum.org/en/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009).
314 Vermuilst, supra note 263, at 477. Regarding the harmonization of non-
preferential RoO, Vermulst stated that, "It is important for developing/low-cost
countries to realize before the negotiations in the CCC start that both tests have a
great potential for protectionist applications and that major trading units such as the
United States, the European Community and Japan are in the process of preparing
for the negotiations; they have, for example, already asked domestic industries for
their recommendations on the contents of possible harmonization rules.
Developing/low-cost countries should prepare for the harmonization negotiations
well in advance not to be presented with faits accomplis in the negotiating
process." Id.
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that also should be kept in mind is that about 30 countries are not WTO
member states. An effective harmonization of origin rules would require the
compliance of all countries with the rules and hence the mentioned 30
countries will change their status from observers to members.
Harmonizing non-preferential and preferential RoO would confront
the popularly termed "Spaghetti Bowl" incident, provide a clear definition for
what constitutes a last substantial transformation, lead to a transparent,
unbiased and proportional application of preferential RoO in preferential trade
regimes, prevent using them as protectionist, trade-diverting, allow for a
globalized system of production, not allow RoO to be regarded as a nightmare
by traders, and not make them act AS INTERNATIONAL TRADE
HINDERANCES.
